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Horseshoers, Doctors and Judges and the
Law on Medical Competencet
B. ABBOTT GOLDBERG*
"Sir, the law is as Isay it is, and so it has been laid down ever since
the law began; and we have several set forms which are held as law,
and so held and used for good reason, though we cannot at present
remember that reason."
Fortescue, C.J.
Despite the eccentric title and what seems to be an unwittingly humorous
quotation from Chief Justice Fortescue, this article is a serious effort to
illustrate to lawyers and doctors the development of legal requirements for
medical competence. The quotation illustrates two points or caveats. The
first is that the joke is not that of Fortescue but of Sir William Searle
Holdsworth, whom I shall identify later. Holdsworth contrived it from a
rather sententious banality by omitting Fortescue's further words, "but with
study and labor we can find it. ... 2 It thus illustrates the dangers,
t The article itself is an elaboration and, I hope, a correction of a talk originally given to
a branch of the Los Angeles County Medical Association and repeated in Marin and San Luis
Obispo. My excuse for offering it is that a number of the listeners suggested that the talk should
be published. This is not a display of my medical knowledge, for, to borrow a phrase, I am a
"lawyer who couldn't tell a pancreas from a rutabaga a la mode .... "E. Kane, Jawbones
and Sawbones in W. PROSSER, THE JUDICIAL HUMORIST 34 (1952).
* Judge of the Superior Court, Sacramento, California.
1. Y.B. 36 Henry 6, f. 25-26, pl. 21 (1458); translated 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 626 (5th ed. 1942) [hereinafter cited as W. HOLDSWORTH]. See also 2 W.
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 524 n.6 (4th ed. 1936) in Law French. The repetition
of the ellipsis in two tongues suggests that it was deliberate rather than the result of postprandial
overindulgence in port wine. See note 25 infra.
2. Y.B. 36 Henry 6, f. 26, pl. 21 (1458).
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unavoidable here, of a historical account based on secondary authorities.
The second is that no one, except perhaps a Chief Justice who completely
dominates his brethren on the bench, can say what the law is. The most any
less august and commanding mortal can say is what the law was when the
courts of last resort last spoke. Each of the three substantive parts of this
article concludes with the law in a state of uncertainty. And this is not bad.
To paraphrase Justice Holmes, this uncertainty is one of the burdens of
living in an organized society, which consciously and conscientiously is
attacking "[o]ne of the most difficult and one of the most permanent
problems which a legal system must face . .. a combination of a due
regard for the claims of substantial justice with a procedure rigid enough to
be workable." 3
This article has as its genesis a request from the Los Angeles County
Medical Association that I speak on "malpractice and its relationship to
quality medical assurance." This subject, of course, assumes that there is a
relationship. But this assumption is not permissible. I have not been able to
find any statistical study that demonstrates that a relationship exists, or, if it
does, what it is. Instead I found references to the lack of reliable data and the
lack of sampling "which would produce credible numbers." 4 And I found a
variety of conflicting statements. For example, R. Crawford Morris, a
prominent defense counsel, advised a Senate Committee in 1969: "I feel
that malpractice litigation does more harm than good to the quality of patient
care.' '5 A few years later he referred to "a man from California" as saying
in effect: "A California survey showed that medical malpractice suits were
the single largest factor in raising the standards of medicine in California." 6
But I have not been able to find any such survey and, after inquiry to the
California Medical Association and other sources, am convinced it was not
made. A more recent study suggests that improving the quality of care
actually increases malpractice litigation, because "modern medicine has
increased the physician's chance of doing harm," 7 but concludes: "In
summary, there is little information available to answer the question of the
effect of the current or future malpractice system on the quality of medical
care."
8
3. Compania General De Tabacos v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 275 U.S. 87, 100
(1927); 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 251 (4th ed. 1936).
4. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COM-
MISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, at 24 (1973) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION REPORT].
5. SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 91ST CONG. IST SESS., MEDICAL MAL-
PRACTIqE: THE PATIENT VERSUS THE PHYSICIAN 464 (Comm. Print 1959) [hereinafter cited as
RIBICOFF REPORT].
6. Morris, Commentary on New Developments in Malpractice Law, in 1975 NAT'L
MEDICOLEGAL SYMP. PROC. 45, 51
7. Brook, Brutoco & Williams, The Relationship Between Medical Malpractice and
Quality of Care, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1197, 1209.
8. Id. at 1221.
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Confronted with these conflicting generalities, I abandoned the subject
and undertook instead to explore a bit of the history of the law relating to the
quality of care. As Mr. Justice Holmes said of understanding the law: "[A]
page of history is worth a volume of logic." 9 He was capsulizing what he
had written forty years before:
However much we may codify the law into a series of self-
sufficient propositions, those propositions will be but a phase in a
continuous growth. To understand their scope fully, to know how
they will be dealt with by judges trained in the past which the law
embodies, we must ourselves know something of that past. The
history of what the law has been is necessary to the knowledge of
what the law is."0
A historical study may be instructive to lawyers and may help doctors
understand the nature of the legal world in which they live, if not reconcile
them to it. For example, the Secretary's Commission on Medical Malprac-
tice:
RECOMMENDS that legal doctrines relating to the liability of
health professionals should be applied in the same manner as they
are applied to all classes of defendants, whether they be favorable
or unfavorable to health professional defendants."
History will show that this recommendation is only a recapitulation of a
process that has been going on for at least 600 years. Whatever one may
think of its merits, no one can accuse it of novelty.
The history of American law does not begin with the settlement of
Jamestown in 1607, or of Plymouth in 1620, or with the American Revolu-
tion in 1776. "It begins when English law begins," and its sources are the
Year Books, which start to show the evolution of the ideas by which
medieval Englishmen regulated their legal relationships.12 In Lord Coke's
famous phrase: "[W]e must peruse our ancient authors, for out of the old
fields cometh the new corn." 13 In some respects, "American lawyers are
more frequently and more importantly concerned with legal history than are
their English brethren."' 14 For example, Coke's opinion in Dr. Bonham's
Case,15 discussed hereafter, ceased to have any medical-legal significance
centuries ago, but it still survives as a source of American constitutional
theory and contains a dogma applied as late as 1977.16
9. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
10. 0. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 37 (1881) [hereinafter cited as 0. HOLMES].
11. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 31; see id. at xix, xx.
12. Thorne, Sir Edward Coke 1552-1952, in SELDEN SOCIETY LECTURES 3 (1952).
13. Carr, The Mission of the Selden Society, in SELDEN SOCIETY LECTURES 3, 17 (1961).
14. Weiner, Uses and Abuses of Legal History: A Practitioner's View, in SELDEN SOCIETY
LECTURES 3, 6 (1962).
15. 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (C.P. 1609).
16. See Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245 (1977). Search warrant issued by magistrate
who is paid for issuance but not for denial violates fourth and fourteenth amendments. Id. at
251.
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No writer on the relation between law and medicine can ignore the
antipathy between the two professions. The Secretary's Commission on
Medical Malpractice stated: "As significant to the malpractice phenomenon
as any of the specific 'legal doctrine' conflicts is an underlying core of
antagonism that exists between law and medicine. . . the: . . generalized
hostility that can be characterized as interprofessional."1 7 This generality
can be illustrated by a number of examples, some humorous, some serious,
and some pathetic. A doctor described a judge as "an ordinary earth-
worm . . .plopped down into a big, soft leather-cushioned mahogany
chair." 18 A Columbia professor of anatomy wrote: "The courts are the
natural hunting grounds of the neurotics. . . .The neurotic, in turn, is the
natural resource of opportunists in the legal profession,"' 19 and accused the
National Association of Claimants' Compensation Attorneys of falling "in-
to the role of antagonist of the medical profession.''20 And Mr. Morris
recounted the happily unkept vow of Dr. Frank Gerbode to quit practice
because of Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Board of Trustees. 21 1
have concluded that this hostility is endemic, perhaps congenital, and not
yet shown to be curable by any known therapy. Another example will show
the inescapable relation between this hostility and legal history.
In May 1871 a little boy was born. He was so frail no one expected him to
survive. "As the family stood round his cot waiting to see him die, the old
doctor turned to his mother and begged her 'not to grieve too much because
had he lived he would have been an idiot. '2 But the baby lived to become
Sir William Holdsworth, Vinerian Professor of English Law and author of A
History of English Law in sixteen monumental and entertaining volumes.
His working life was spent teaching in the morning, punting in the after-
noon, and writing his history in the evening after two or three glasses of port
wine with dinner.23 Comparison of his work with that of some other
historians suggests that his bibulous habit was beneficial.
Search of Holdsworth's History discloses nothing particularly relating to
doctors. He simply lumps surgeons with smiths, horsedoctors, innkeepers,
vintners, butchers and carriers. This juxtaposition could be construed as sly
lawyer-like disparagement of the physician who predicted Holdsworth's
untimely demise. But this construction would be wrong. Other historians
make a similar amalgamation, and it reflects only the fact that even at the
old law there were persons "who were considered by their calling to show a
17. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 36.
18. E. Kane, Jawbones & Sawbones, in W. PROSSER, THE JUDICIAL HUMORIST 32-35
(1952).
19. F. METrLER, THE MEDICAL SOURCEBOOK 60 (1959).
20. Id. at 76.
21. RIBBICOFF REPORT, supra note 5, at 453, citing Salgo v. Leland Stanford, 154 Cal.
App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957).
22. Goodhart, Sir William Searle Holdsworth, in SELDEN SOCIETY LECTURES, 8-9 (1954).
23. Id. at 15; S. WILLISTON, LIFE AND LAw 247 (1949).
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certain degree of skill. . . If they did not show this degree of skill they
were liable to an action of trespass on the case for negligence.' '24 Similarly
they might be liable for an action on the case for deceit even in the absence
of express misrepresentations. "The ground for allowing an action in tort in
both these classes of cases was at bottom public policy. It was for the
interest of the community-then as now-that persons who professed a
particular calling should show an adequate amount of care, skill and honesty
in following their calling.' '25
Since there is no discrete historical separation of the law relative to the
quality of care in medicine as distinct from that of other skilled callings, I
have made my own. For convenience and because it happens to fit the
chronology, I have divided it under three heads: the standard of care applied
in malpractice suits by which patients seek damages from doctors for alleged
wrongs; legislative efforts to control the quality of care by licensing of
physicians; and private efforts by medical societies and hospitals to control
the quality of care, what has been called "Government by Medical Collea-
gues. "26 In each of these categories the law has developed by reference to
rules, adopted from fields totally unrelated to medicine, which the courts
have considered to have general application. It is not an overstatement to say
there is no law of medicine that can be dissociated from the law generally
and considered solely as an integrated unit.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE STANDARD OF CARE
"[T]he law deals only or mainly with manifested facts. "27 Thus it is not
surprising that the facts of medicine appeared long before there was any law
relating to them. As late as Tudor times much medical treatment was purely
domestic. Even for the treatment of problems more serious than minor
ailments, cuts and bruises, "[m]ost people had to rely on themselves and
their neighbors . ... 28 Nevertheless, "besides home healing there were
services rendered by people who depended on them for a livelihood and laid
claim to special skill." 2 9 The first practitioners are said to have been monks,
frequently the abbot himself, and friars, who had the old Byzantine medical
texts in their monastery libraries. After the Norman conquest in 1066 Jews
appeared in England, and the Byzantine teaching was superseded by the
24. 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 1, at 385-86.
25. 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 1, at 385-86 ;.T. PLUCKNE-T, A CONCISE HISiORY OF
THE COMMON LAW 471 (5th ed. 1956) [hereinafter cited as T. PLUCKNETTI; Prichard, Scott i,.
Shephard (1773) and The Emergence of the Tort of Negligence, in SELDEN SOCIETY LECTURES
22-33 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Prichard]; see A. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW
OF CONTRACT 225-34, 632 (1975) [hereinafter cited as A. SIMPSON].
26. D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, THE PARENCHYMA OF LAW 143 (1960).
27. 0. HOLMES, supra note 10, at 234.
28. 1 G. CLARK, A HISTORY OF THE ROYAL COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS OF LONDON 5 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as G. CLARK]; see Creighton, Medicine and Surgery in 2 SOCIAL ENGLAND 83
(H. Traill ed. 1902) [hereinafter cited as Creighton].
29. 1 P. CLARK, supra note 28, at 1.
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Arabian teaching, including the generalities of Avicenna, perhaps, because
the "learned men of that nation [Jews] were, indeed, the chief depositaries
of the Arabian medical teaching, which was then the dominant authority." 30
And the Arabian teaching remained authoritative until the Reformation. 31
As early as the twelfth century there was a complaint that "[g]reed...
and love of power or authority are the besetting vices of the physician.' '32
But the monks became so esteemed as physicians that they neglected their
religious duties, and in 1139 and again in 1163 the Pope interdicted their
practice of physic and surgery. This interdiction was, apparently, easily
evaded by the monks. Similarly the Jews evaded the canon law forbidding
them to practice on Christians, because "[t]here were Jews practising
medicine at every Court of Europe." 3 3 Presumably this was because neither
monks nor Jews had any competent rivals. 34 But the stage was being set for
the appearance of lay gentile physicians and surgeons.
In the light of subsequent history, it seems surprising that no malpractice
actions against Jews, monks or friars have been unearthed. This gap is not
an indication of the excellence of their ministrations; it has a legal rather
than a medical explanation. The Jews were expelled from England in 1290,
and the special laws under which they were serfs of the kings seem not to
have left "any permanent marks upon the body of our law." 35 Monks
professed were civilly dead, as were friars, and as a general rule lacked all
legal capacity. 36 They could not have any property and could be sued only
with the consent of their religious superiors, the abbots or bishops. If a suit
were allowed, it had to be against the abbot or bishop in his capacity as a
"corporation sole" not as a natural person. This distinction was difficult for
the medieval lawyers and, coupled with the problems of effective recovery,
was apparently enough to discourage litigation. 37 Thus, the absence of suits
against Jews, monks and friars seems to reflect the problems of their special
legal status rather than the quality of their medical treatment.
With the appearance of lay practitioners of ordinary legal status there
began to be efforts to control the quality of care by guilds of grocers,
barbers, apothecaries and surgeons and by suits for malpractice in the
various local courts, as distinguished from the king's courts. There are
30. Creighton, supra note 28, at 84.
31. Creighton, supra note 28, at 86.
32. Creighton, supra note 28, at 84, attributed to the Satirist, John of Salisbury. Greed
was still a complaint 300 years later. "In these times [1416] many more [surgeons] dread the loss
of money than are amenable to the dictates of honesty or conscience .... ." Cosman,
Medieval Medical Malpractice: The Dicta and the Dockets, 49 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MED. 22, 35(1973). I am indebted to Drs. David Costanza of Greenbrae, California, and Gert Brieger of the
University of California, San Francisco, for this instructive reference.
33. Creighton, supra note 28, at 84.
34. See Creighton, supra note'28, at 84.
35. 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 475 (2d ed. 1968).
36. Id. at 489.
37. Id. at 433.
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various instructive and entertaining accounts of these efforts, which show
how some of our present problems replicate those of the thirteenth and
fourteenth centuries.38 There was also some effort to control medical prac-
tice by "ordinances," which then meant legislation by the king without the
assent of Parliament. 39 But as Plucknett pointed out, these ordinances have
played a very small part in the formation of English public law. And the
suits in the local courts, although quaint and amusing, played little role in
the formation of the common law. The local courts absorbed the rules of the
king's court rather than vice versa, and "[w]e must look to the rules of the
king's court for the foundations of the common law.'"'4 Clark, a nonlegal
writer, warned against "the tendency of some medical historians to ascribe
too much importance to the companies of barber-surgeons," and says, "[t]o
some extent these writers were misled by economic historians who transfer-
red some of the romance of the guilds from the Continent to England, where
their history was altogether more modest."'41 The same precaution applies to
legal history.
The legal history of medicine begins for practical purposes with the desire
of litigants to evade the jurisdiction of local courts.4' One device was by a
petition to the Chancellor, through whom the king maintained a tribunal that
claimed "to administer justice according to good faith and conscience" and
which could compel the production of evidence.4 3 Thus in the late 14th or
early 15th century we find a petition to the Chancellor to appoint "the
surgeons of our Lord the King" to examine the petitioner to establish the
truth of his claim that a surgeon set his arm improperly. 4 The petitioner
claimed he was oppressed by "maintenance" (unjustifiable litigation) at his
residence. 45 If proved, this was a sufficient ground for what would now be
called equitable relief. 46 Of course, the request to appoint independent and
reputable surgeons suggests an early effort to escape what has since been
38. 1 G. CLARK, supra note 28, at 6-18; Cosman, Medieval Medical Malpractice: The
Dicta and the Dockets, 49 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MED. 22 (1973). See generally F. BULLOCK, The
Law Relating to Medical Dental and Veterinary Practice (1929) [hereinafter cited as F.
BULLOCK].
39. F. BULLOCK, supra note 38, at 9-27; 1 G. CLARK, supra note 28, at 17-18; A. DICEY,
THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 48 (6th ed. 1902) [hereinafter cited as A. DICEY]; T. Plucknett,
supra note 25, at 322-23.
40. 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 1, at 8.
41. 1 G. CLARK, supra note 28, at 8.
42. See A. SIMPSON, supra note 25, at 224. On the evasion of the Statute of Gloucester,
which was intended to confine actions for less than 40 shillings to the local courts, see 2 W.
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 1, at 399. On the superior quality of the royal courts see 2 W.
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 1, at 251-52.
43. T. Plucknett & J. Barton. St. German's Doctor and Student, 91 SELDEN SOCIETY
xxviii, xii (1974).
44. Baildon, Select Cases in Chancery, 10 SELDEN SOCIETY 123-24 (1896).
45. Id. at 124.
46. Id.; Maitland, English Law 1309-1600 (1894), in SELECTED HISTORICAL ESSAYS 131 (H.
Cam. ed. 1957). There was a similar procedure by bill rather than writ before the King's Bench,
but I have found no medical examples; Sayles, The Court of King's Bench in Law and History,
SELDEN SOCIETY LECTURE 1959 at 14-15.
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called the "conspiracy of silence." A contemporary suggested remedy is
that of the Secretary's Commission on Medical Malpractice:
The Commission RECOMMENDS that organized medicine and
osteopathy establish an official policy encouraging members of
their professions to cooperate fully in medical malpractice actions
so that justice will be assured for all parties; and the Commission
encourages the establishment of pools from which expert wit-
nesses can be drawn.47
But the more common way of invoking the jurisdiction of the king's
courts was to obtain a writ of trespass "vi et armis et contra pacem regis,"
that is, with force and arms and against the king's peace. If this formula was
omitted, the suit would have to be in the sheriff's court, for a distinction was
made between the king's peace and the sheriff's peace. 48 And thus in the
middle of the fourteenth century we find a number of what Prichard calls
"dishonest writs of trespass vi et armis" brought in the king's courts. 49 He
refers to:
the suspiciously large number of writs of trespass vi et armis
brought against farriers shortly before 1367. The picture conjured
up in one's mind by these last writs-that of a strange madness
suddenly afflicting the stolid English blacksmith and causing him
to rush about equicidally striking at horses &, i et armis and contra
pacem-is one that defies belief. Even the Black Death cannot
make that picture credible; without doubt, we have another dis-
honest writ here.50
To cope with these dishonest writs the king's courts devised what came to
be called the action of "trespass sur son case" later commonly called
"trespass on the case" or even "case." This writ accommodated the desire
of the litigants to remain in the royal courts and eliminated the alternative of
returning non-forcible wrongs to the local courts. "The action against the
incompetent farrier became an honest action on the case. "5 1 And it is from
these honest actions against farriers brought in the king's courts and recount-
ed in the Year Books that our present law of medical competence derives.
The Year Books are collections of lawyers' or law students' notes of
proceedings in the king's courts from the time of Edward I to Henry VIII,
about 1270 to 1535.52 They were reprinted in a folio edition in 1678-79 in
old Gothic type. "The size is cumbrous;" the typography is "unpleasant to
the eye;" the manuscripts "were read and reproduced with inadequate care,
to use the mildest possible term;" they contain cryptic abbreviations; and
47. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at xx and 36-37.
48. 0. HOLMES, supra note 10, at 84-85.
49. Prichard, supra note 25, at 8.
50. Prichard, supra note 25, at 8-9.
51. Prichard, supra note 25, at 9.
52. 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 1, at 525.
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they are in that peculiar language "Law French., ,5 3 "Many lawyers in good
business have never read a word of them. . . . Yet some knowledge of
them is needful for every one who wishes to know the law as a scholar and
not merely as a practitioner. . .. "54 Some have been edited and translated
but, unfortunately, not those referred to herein. The authors of the Year
Books "cared very little who the parties were, and less about the end of the
case. Good pleading was their ambition. . . . "I' "Instruction for pleaders
rather than points of substantive law was the primary object .... ",56 They
were compiled to show how to get into court and stay there. Relating cases
from the Year Books presents problems of paleotypography, translation,
reinterment of the dead procedures, and resuscitation of the still living
substance. But in these dusty, fusty antiques are the first glimmers of the
modern law of the quality of medical care.
The first case was against a surgeon in 1374.57 Dean Prosser, however,
cited a case from 1369, which he purported to be against "a surgeon who
negligently treated a patient.' '58 His citation is so wrong that it could qualify
for his own book The Judicial Humorist, for the defendant was a horse
doctor and the patient was a horse.59 But in 1374 "Un home post bre de
Trespass sur son cas devers un J. Mort surgeon."' 6 (Is the name Mort,
death, significant?) The man alleged that Mort undertook to cure his wound-
ed hand of its maladie, that through Mort's negligence the hand was made
worse, and that the man was maiheme to his damage. The man did not
allege the place of the undertaking in his writ but alleged it only in his
"count," the oral pleading following the writ. Without an allegation of the
place in the writ, the court did not know from which vicinity to summon the
jury, for the undertaking may have been in one county and the misfeasance
53. F. POLLOCK, A FIRST BOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE 295-305 (4th ed. 1918).
54. Id. at 303.
55. F. POLLOCK, THE GENIUS OF THE COMMON LAW 24 (1911).
56. 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 1, at 538.
57. Y.B. Trin. 48 Edw. 3, f. 6, pl. 11 (1374). The reference TDin. is to the Trinity Term.
Each year there were four terms of court, named after ecclesiastical festivals, Hilary, Paschal
or Easter, Trinity and Michaelmas. The term is needed to fix the date of a regnal year if a king
died or was deposed in mid-term. Terms of court were abolished in California by the Constitu-
tion of 1879. The matter is now regulated by statute, I B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE,
Courts §53 at 332-33 (2d ed. 1970), and, hopefully, terms of court have been relegated to that
"country from whose bourn no traveler returns."
58. W. PROSSER, SELECTED TOPICS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 381 n.5 (1953); citing Waldon v.
Marshall, Y.B. Mich. 43 Edw. 3, f. 6, pl. 11 (1369).
59. Id. Prosser's citation does not exist. 43 Edw. 3, f. 6 reports cases from the Hilary term
pl. 13 to 18, and none are in point. The compilers of the Year Books had "a most remarkable
contempt. . . especially for proper names," 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 1, at 536, so the
cases are anonymous, and Prosser must have invented the name. There is a case in Y.B. Mich.
43 Edw. 3, f. 33, pl. 38 (1369), where "Will. de Waldon post un briefe envs [envers] un J.
Mareschal," because "said John" undertook to cure Will's horse of its infirmite and through
"said John's" negligent care the horse perished. Obviously "Mareschal" was a description of
John's occupation, one who treated horses, a farrier, or shoeing smith, Oxford Engl. Dic. sb.
Marshal, not his surname. For more nearly correct citations and descriptions see F. BULLOCK,
supra note 38, at 430. The case has some bearing on the characterization of malpractice as a tort
rather than a breach of contract or crime. See note 68 infra.
60. Y.B. Trin. 48 Edw. 3, f. 6, pl. 11 (1374).
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in another. 61 Therefore, the discrepancy between the writ and the count was
an important matter, and the man lost.62 The paucity of reported decisions
does not necessarily indicate there was little litigation. There was an almost
identical defective writ and result a year later, but not reported in the Year
Books.63
What is interesting in Mort's case is not the result but the colloquy among
the judges and the attorneys. The whole court agreed that an action on the
case lay with neither allegations that the wrong had been committed "vi et
armis ne contra pacum &c" in Latin or "force et armes ne encounter le
peace" in French. I In reaching this conclusion two other possibilities were
considered. Since an undertaking was alleged, should not the action have
been covenant? To maintain covenant, however, would have required an
especialty, a document under seal. But for "such a little thing one cannot
always have a clerk available to draw the especialty."65
Therefore, covenant was not necessary and an action on the case was
appropriate. In simple language, malpractice was treated as a tort rather than
a breach of contract. And so the law is in California to this day, 66 although
here, as in the later English cases, the result was derived not directly from
the Year Books but from the later law relating to common carriers. 67
Another and more obscure point was discussed. The plaintiff had alleged
that he was maiheme. Mayhem was an appealable but not indictable
felony. 6s Although not stated in the Year Books, perhaps because it was so
elementary, the rule was "that if a tort amounts to a felony the injured
party's right of action [is] barred."69 This rule was rejected some 400 years
later in what appears to be the first reported malpractice case in the United
States. 70 But in the 14th century it was still alive and troublesome. Thus,
there was considerable discussion of whether the plaintiff should have
proceeded by appeal rather than by writ. If appeal were proper, the trial
61. A. SIMPSON, supra note 25, at 234-35. Eventually it was settled that the jury could be
called from either. Id. at 236.
62. T. PLUCKNETr, su.pra note 25, at 409; see 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 1, at 250.
63. The Surgeon's Case (1375) translated in A. SIMPSON, supra note 25, at 627.
64. Y.B. Trin. 48 Edw. 3, f. 6, pl. 11 (1374).
65. Id.; cf. A. SIMPSON, supra note 25, at 223-24 (relating similar later holdings allowing
the evasion of the local courts).
66. Huysman v. Kirsch, 6 Cal. 2d 302, 306, 57 P.2d 908, 910 (1936). The contract between
a physician and patient is "merely a matter of inducement" out of which the duty to use due
care arises.
67. Harding v. Liberty Hospital Corp., 177 Cal. 520,522-23, 171 P. 98,99 (1918), following
Basler v. Sacramento Ry. Co., 166 Cal. 33, 134 P. 993 (1913).
The tug-of-war between contract and tort was fought out in one field alone. . . that
of the common carrier; actions against smiths, surgeons, attorneys and the like, do
not seem to have provoked judicial analysis until after the struggle was over.
Prichard, supra note 25, at 25. The statement in D. LOUISELL & M. WILLIAMS, THE PARENCHY-
MA OF LAW 174-75 (1960), that originally physicians' conduct "was bottomed on contractual
responsibility" appears to be based on historically inaccurate authority. See A. SIMPSON, supra
note 25, at 228-29.
68. 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 1, at 361.
69. 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 1, at 331.
70. Cross v. Guthery, 2.Root 90, 1 Am. Dec. 61 (Conn. 1794); W. PROSSER, TORTS §2 at 8
(4th ed. 1971).
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could have been by battle rather than by jury; Mort, if vanquished, would
have suffered loss of life or limb; and the plaintiff would have had no civil
recovery. 7
1
We can assume that the court had in mind the "dishonest writs" allowed
against farriers then relatively recent, 72 and this led to a discussion of the
analogy of a surgeon to a horseshoer. One judge said: "If I deliver my horse
to a farrier to shoe, if he harms my horse, I shall have a writ of trespass
against him, and if I deliver my horse to a marshall to care for and through
his negligent care my horse is maimed, I shall have the same writ." 73 To
this another replied, "This is true because the horse cannot have an ac-
tion." ,74 (A degree of flippancy is not uncommon in the Year Books.) 75 And
then he continued: "But if the farrier or marshal does all that he can or
shows all diligence in the care of the horse, there is no reason to hold him
liable, because there is a great diversity between the two cases. '"76 The
analogy was not acted on in the case against Mort because of the deficien-
cies in the pleadings, but this seems to be the first indication that surgeons
are to be treated by the same substantive rules as the practitioners of other
skilled callings.77
Once suggested, the analogy of surgeons to horse doctors became belove'd
of medieval lawyers. It was repeated and enlarged to include doctors
generally at least as early as 1436.78 And it was extended further in 1471 to
hold a doctor liable for administration of medications through a servant, an
early example of a physician's possible liability for acts of his medical
colleagues .79
71. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 466, 488,632-34 (S. Milsom
ed. 1968).
72. Y.B. Mich. 43 Edw. 3, f. 33, pl. 38 (1369); Y.B. Trin. 46 Edw. 3, f. 19, pl. 19 (1372),
discussed in T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 25, at 471; Prichard, supra note 25, at 9, 36.
73. Y.B. Trin. 48 Edw. 3, f. 6, pl. 11 (1374).
74. Id.
75. 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 1, at 546-47. E.g., one full report includes comments
not found in the abridgements, e.g., a delightful colloquy on the proper way to catch eels in
which Percy J. tells counsel 'you are not a good fisherman, I can see.' Id. at 41. McGovern,
Book Review (Yearbooks of Richard II; 2 Richard II, 1378-1379. Arnold ed.), 20 AM. J. LEGAL
HisT. at 330 (1976).
76. Y.B. Trin. 48 Edw 3, f. 6, pl. 11 (1374).
77. Many of the medieval cases are collected in F. BULLOCK, supra note 38, at 262-71.
Bullock's compilation was followed in Sandor, The History of Professional Liability Suits in the
United States, 163 A.M.A.J. 459 (1957); Sandor's was followed in Stetler, The History of
Reported Medical Professional Liability Cases, 30 TEMP. L.Q. 366, 367 (1957); and Stetler's was
followed in C. KRAMER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 2 (1972). What I have tried to show is the
integration of the medical cases into the general medieval law.
78. 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 1, at 430:
So if a smith makes a covenant with me to shoe my horse well and properly, and he
shoes him and lames him, I shall have a good action. So if a doctor takes upon himself
to cure me of my diseases, and he gives me medicines, but does not cure me, I shall
have my action on my case.
Citing Y.B. Trin. 14 Hen. 6, f. 18, pl. 58 (1436).
79. Y.B. Trin. 11 Edw. 4, f. 6, pl. 10 (1471); 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 1, at 387.
If a man undertakes to cure me of a certain disease, and gives me medicine which
makes me worse, I shall have action on my case against him; but if he thus undertakes
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By 1534 the proposition was stated in general terms in Fitzherbert's The
New Natura Brevium,s8 a student text book of somewhat doubtful authent-
icity and only arguable accuracy.8' Anthony Fitzherbert was one of the
judges of Henry VIII. He may appear to us as a somewhat sinister figure
because he sat on the commission that condemned Saint Thomas More.
82
But his accuracy or character are of no moment to us, because his generali-
zation was accepted and has itself become a historical fact. And "[e]very
historian knows that belief itself is a historical fact .... "83
Fitzherbert wrote:
But if a smith prick my horse with a nail, &c. I shall have my
action upon the case against him, without any warranty by the
smith to do it well . . . .For it is the duty of every artificer to
exercise his art rightly and truly as he ought. 4
This generalization simply means that the artificer need not undertake
specially to use due care.
It involves a shift in emphasis from a theory of self-imposed
liability for negligence to a theory that liability is imposed by law
... .For everybody knows that the one unforgivable sin in a
smith is to drive the nail into the living flesh, an error that might be
excused in an amateur but can never be excused in a professional.
It is the medieval equivalent of leaving a swab in a patient. The
professional status of the defendant can. . . be used to show...
what standard of conduct is appropriate. . . .What was im-
portant was that he was an artificer, a skilled professional.85
Fitzherbert's generalization became so acceptable that it has since been
cited without question by writers as diverse and as critical as Mr. Justice
Holmes,86 "the great dissenter," and Dr. Fred Mettler, some of whose
animadversions against lawyers have already been related. 87 Furthermore, it
has for hundreds of years been accepted and acted upon by the courts.
In 1614 Chief Justice Edward Coke, of whom more will appear hereafter,
participated in Everard v. Hopkins,88 an action on the case by a master
and then commands his servant to administer the medicine and I am made worse, I
have no action against the servant but against the master.
Holdsworth omitted the following:
And if one undertakes to shoe my horse, if he orders his servant to do so and the
servant harms the horse, the action lies against the master.
80. A. FITZHERBERT, THE NEW NATURA BREVIUM. at 214-15 (9th ed. 1793).
81. 2" W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 1, at 522. Fitzherbert cites at 214-15 Y.B. Trin. 46
Edw. 3, f. 19, pl. 19 (1372), and an inconclusive case of malpractice against an attorney, Y.B.
Hil. 11 Henry 6, f. 10, p1. 10, Pasch. f. 24, pl. 1, Trin. f. 55, pl. 36 (1433), which is discussed in 3
W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 1, at 431-32. See A. SIMPSON, supra note 25, at 234.
82. 4 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 1, at 115.
83. Cam, Magna Carta-Event or Document, in SELDEN SOCIETY LECTURES 26 (1965).
84. A. FITZHERBERT, THE NEW NATURA BREVIUM at 214-15 (9th ed. 1793).
85. A. SIMPSON, supra note 25, at 233.
86. 0. HOLMES, supra note 10, at 184.
87. F. METrLER, THE MEDICAL SOURCEBOOK 75 (1959).
88. 80 Eng. Rep. 1164 (K.B. 1614).
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against a "common chyrurgeon" for administering "unwholesome
medicines" to the master's servant so that his services were lost "per
spatium one whole year. "89 Although the court held that such an action was
proper, no judgment was rendered because the "pleading was not good nor
formal," and the case ended with a settlement. 90 But in the argument both
Mort's case from the Year Books and Fitzherbert were cited as authority,
and the analogy of the smith pricking the horse was referred to repeatedly by
the judges in language that was obviously paraphrased from Fitzherbert. 91
Coke was a received authority in the United States. Thus it is not
surprising that the first reported American malpractice case, in 1794, took
the form of an action on the case (for an improperly performed mastectomy
in which the plaintiff got a judgment for 40 pounds).92 In another early
action on the case for malpractice, McCandless v. McWha, 93 holding a
surgeon liable for "professional negligence," the court quoted Fitzherbert:
If he applies to a SURGEON and he treats him improperly, he is
liable to an action even though he undertook gratis to attend the
patient, because his situation implies skill in surgery. . . . The
principle is contained in the pithy saying of Fitzherbert that 'it is
the duty of every artificer to exercise his art rightly and truly, as
he ought.'94
McCandless became something of a leading case. It was cited by the New
York Court of Appeals in Pike v. Honsinger.95 Pike was cited by the
California Supreme Court in Hesler v. California Hospital Co. ,96 which
appears to be the first California case stating the general duty of care of a
doctor. And Hesler was last cited in 1976 in Landeros v. Flood,97 for the
general proposition that "a physician is required to possess and exercise, in
both diagnosis and treatment, that reasonable degree of knowledge and skill
which is ordinarily possessed and exercised by other members of his profes-
sion in similar circumstances.' '98 Thus we trace into our present law of
doctors the medieval law of horseshoers.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1166.
91. The reference to the "common surgeon" means only that he held himself out to treat
the public. It does not mean that he was under a duty to treat all comers or enjoyed a monopoly
like a present common carrier; here it means only that he was liable for negligence without the
need to allege an assumpsit or special undertaking. A. SIMPSON, supra note 25, at 229; Prichard,
supra note 25, at 25-26, 36, 39.
92. Cross v. Guthery, 2 Root 90, 1 Am. Dec. 61, 61 (Conn. 1794).
93. 22 Pa. 261, 269 (1853).
94. Id.
95. 155 N.Y. 201, 210, 49 N.E. 760, 762 (1898). "The leading case of Pike v. Honsinger
recognized throughout the country as the authority, succinctly expresses the obligation owed
by a doctor to his patient ... " C. KRAMER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 6 (1972). Cf. Mecham v.
McLeary, 193 Neb. 457, 464, 227 N.W.2d 829, 834 (1975) (citing McCandless on a patient's
contributory negligence in failing to follow a physician's instructions).
96. 178 Cal. 764, 766, 174 P. 654, 655 (1918).
97. 17 Cal. 3d 399, 408, 511 P.2d 389, 392-93, 131 Cal. Rptr. 69, 72-73 (1976) (duty to
diagnose and report battered child syndrome).
98. Id.
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When Simpson wrote that driving a horseshoe nail into the living flesh
was the medieval equivalent of leaving a swab in a patient, he was not
engaging in a rhetorical flourish. His statement is startling only because of
its accuracy. Despite all the twists and turnings of the law, and despite the
actual results of cases that can be explained by procedural manipulations,
the rule has remained the same. The persistence of the rule makes one
wonder if there is not a "Law of Nature [which] consists . . .of those
principles which are so fundamental that they [are] binding upon man...
everywhere and for ever, irrespective of time, place, or circum-
stance. . ... 99
And the rule is not limited to farriers and doctors. It is a rule applicable to
all cases of professional status or skilled callings. As was said in Leighton v.
Sargent,10 0 an action of trespass on the case against a physician:
These principles are of great consequence to all the classes of
professional men who are employed by others to transact business
requiring especial skill and knowledge. The duties and respon-
sibilities of all these classes, as those of lawyers and physicians,
engineers, machinists, ship-masters, builders, brokers, etc., are
governed by the same general rules."''
So when the California Supreme Court in 1971 applied the statute of
limitations as rigorously to attorneys as it had to doctors, it cited not only the
analogy of physicians but also those of accountants, insurance agents and
others. "02 The most comprehensive statement of the modern and general law
is that in the American Law Institute's Second Restatement of Torts Section
299A:
Unless he represents that he has greater or less skill or knowledge,
one who undertakes to render services in the practice of a profes-
sion or trade is required to exercise the skill and knowledge
normally possessed by members of that profession or trade in
good standing in similar communities. 103
The comment to Section 299A says that it applies not only to doctors and
lawyers but also to a variety of occupations ranging from accountants to
plumbers. '' On inspection, it is clear that it adds very little to Fitzherbert
but some cautionary language about representations of greater or lesser skill
99. T. Plucknett & J. Barton, St. German's Doctorand Student, 91 SELDEN SOCIETY Xxvii
(1974). The Puritans adopted the concept from Coke and others. See G. HASKINS, LAW AND
AUTHORITY IN EARLY MASSACHUSETTS 118 (1960).
100. 27 N.H. 460, 59 Am. Dec. 388 (1853).
101. Id. at 468, 59 Am. Dec. at 389-90. The court noted another issue that is still current.
"At the present moment, it is to be feared there is a tendency [by juries] to impose some
perilous obligations beyond the requirements of the law upon some classes of professional
men." Id. at 468, 59 Am. Dec. at 390. For a recent discussion of "the manner in which
standards of medical care can be set by juries" see Rubsamen, Medical Malpractice, 235
SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN 18, 21 (Aug. 1976).
102. Neel v. Magana, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 186, 491 P.2d 421,427, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837, 843 (1971).
103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §299A (1965).
104. Id. at Comment b.
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and a reference to the amorphous locality rule. °5 The Restatement is not
only a correct paraphrase of the history, but it seems to be a prediction of the
future. Recently the California Supreme Court applied it to a bank acting as
an executor.106 And the recommendation of the Secretary's Commission on
Malpractice simply reiterates it. 107
The notion that doctors are victims of some sort of legal malevolence has
no historical or current support. On the contrary, doctors have recently
become the beneficiaries of particular statutory benevolence precipated by
the so-called "malpractice crisis." For example, in California the statute of
limitations is now more favorable to doctors than it is to lawyers. 108 And the
limitation on recovery for "noneconomic losses," that is, pain and suffer-
ing, is more advantageous to doctors than it is to plumbers. 109
Whether such legislative grace to physicians is constitutional is still an
open question. In Illinois a limitation of damages to $500,000 was held
invalid under the state constitution. 110 Two lower courts have held the Ohio
statute limiting general damages to $200,000 unconstitutional on state and
federal grounds."' In Idaho the court declined to pass on the question but
sent a case back to the trial court to determine whether there is in fact a
"medical malpractice insurance crisis." ' 112 The United States Supreme
Court recently declined to review a case on the Ohio statute of limitations,
but this is not equivalent to approval of the statute." 3 And there these
matters rest for the moment.
LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS TO CONTROL THE STANDARD OF CARE
The deliberate effort to improve the quality of care by legal means has a
history quite apart from the common law dealing with the redress of private
grievances. It is the history of the legislation regulating the practice of
medicine by establishing standards for licensing physicians and disciplining
105. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 243,246,502 P.2d 1, 10, 12, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505,514,516
(1972); Gist v. French, 136 Cal. App. 2d 247, 269-71, 288 P.2d 1003, 1017-18 (1955); RESTATE-
MENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §299A, Comment g (1965).
106. Estate of Beach,15 Cal. 3d 623, 631,542 P.2d 994,998, 125 Cal. Rptr. 570,574 (1975).
107. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 31.
108. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §340.5.
109. CAL. CIv. CODE §3333.2(b).
110. Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Il. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976).
Ill. Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903 (1976);
Graley v. Satayatham, 74 Ohio Op. 2d 316, 343 N.E.2d 832 (1976). See generally Comment, An
Analysis of State Legislative Responses to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 1975 DUKE L.J.
1417, citing Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973) (holding the
California automobile guest statute unconstitutional) and stating: "[A] reviewing court could
well conclude that forcing the most seriously injured plaintiffs to bear the full cost of continued
availability of medical services is unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious." 1975 DUKE L.J.
1417, 1421.
112. Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 874, 555 P.2d 399, 412, 416 (1976),
petition for cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3520 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1977) (No. 76-972).
113. Fay v. Richter (Ohio App. unreported), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3667 (U.S. Apr. 4,
1977) (No. 76-1128). The "denial of certiorari imparts no implication or inference concerning
the court's view of the merits." Hughes Tool Co. v Trans World Airlines, 409 U.S. 363,365, n.1
(1973).
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them for misconduct or incompetence. An abortive Act of Parliament,
passed in the third year of Henry VIII 1511, provided for licensing of
physicians and surgeons by the bishops on the advice of "expert per-
sons."' 1 4 Presumably the licensing function was delegated to ecclesiastics
because only the church had a developed administration covering the whole
country.115 Today the most interesting aspect of the Act of 1511 is a portion
of its preamble, which recites the need for "great learning" in the practice
of medicine, its actual practice by "common Artificers, as Smiths, Weavers
and Women," and the resulting "grievous Hurt, Damage, and Destruction
of many of the King's liege People, most especially of them that cannot
discern the cunning from the uncunning."116 Discerning "the cunning from
the uncunning," the skilled from the unskilled, remained a problem. In
1858 the preamble to the first British general Medical Act recited the same
purpose: "Whereas it is expedient that Persons requiring Medical Assist-
ance should be enabled to distinguish qualified from unqualified Practition-
ers." 117 And the California Supreme Court reiterated the need as recently as
December 2, 1976, in upholding the statute requiring the licensing of
midwives, "for many women must necessarily rely on those with qualifica-
tions which they cannot personally verify." '"1 8 Thus, although this discus-
sion is of antique materials, it is of current issues. We are still pouring old
wine into new bottles.
The effect of the Act of 1511 was substantially diminished in 1518
when Henry VIII granted a charter to the "President of the College or
Commonalty of the Faculty of Physicians, London.""19 The charter was
confirmed by an Act of Parliament in 1522,120 and it is with the Charter of
1518 and the Act of 1522 that the history of regulation has its practical
beginning.
One striking feature of the Act of 1522 is the apparent lack of controversy
over its passage. This seems to be due to two reasons. The first is the
eminence of the sponsors of the Charter of 1518. King Henry "held it
necessary to restrain the boldness of wicked men, who professed physic
more for avarice than out of confidence and good conscience," and "partly
imitating the example of the well governed cities in Italy," at the instance of
his own physicians, including Thomas Linacre, and Thomas Wolsey,
"Archbishop, and our well beloved Chancellor of our kingdom of Eng-
114. 3 Henry VIII, Chapter 11 (1511).
115. 1 G. CLARK, supra note 28, at 54-58.
116. 1 G. CLARK, supra note 28, at 54. "Cunning" here has its archaic meaning of skillful
without a derogatory connotation of slyness. OXFORD ENGLISH DICIONARY.
117. F. BULLOCK, supra note 38, at 103; 2 G. CLARK, supra note 28, at 792-30.
118. Bowland v. Municipal Court, 18 Cal. 3d 479, 495, 556 P.2d 1081, 1089, 134 Cal. Rptr.
630, 638 (1976).
119. Dr. Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 638, 639 (C. P. 1609). The Act of 1511 was not
repealed until 1948. It had some vitality as late as 1602. See I G. CLARK, supra note 28, at 5.
120. The Charter, Act and amendments are set out at length in Coke's report of Dr.
Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 639-41.
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land," therefore, granted the Charter. 12' Linacre was a man of remarkable
attainments. He was not only a physician who had studied in Italy but also a
scholar, a tutor to a prince, and "the first Englishman who gained a
European reputation as a humanist."1 2 2 He earned the highest accolade that
can be given a doctor: all of his known patients, with one elderly exception,
survived him. Considering Linacre's background and associates, it is poss-
ible to consider the Charter as one manifestation of the progress and
popularity of the "New Learning" in England.123 Wolsey was then at the
height of his powers, which he later lost. We recall him now for his
admonition to those in public life: "Had I but served God as diligently as I
served the King, He would not have given me over in my gray hairs." 124
The second reason for expedition in the grant of the adoption Charter and
the passage of the Act seems to have been medical urgency. "It was in 1518
that an English government for the first time issued orders for the prevention
of the plague. . . . There was evidently a sense of emergency." 12
In gross outline the Charter and Act gave the College authority to license
the "exercise of the faculty of physic" in London and its suburbs within a
radius of seven miles and authority to punish malpractice and unlicensed
practice by fining or imprisoning offenders. 126 We can infer that there was
some problem enforcing the Act, because in 1554, under Queen Mary, it
was amended to provide not only that the College had power to imprison
offenders, but that the gaolers, except of the Tower of London, should
receive them. 127 The need for this amendment may be no more than an
example of some court's unreported "niggardly exposition of every legislat-
ing word.' '1 28 But the Charter and Act did not come before the courts in any
significant way until Dr. Bonham's Case'29 in 1609 and 1610. Then the
Court of Common Pleas spoke through its Chief Justice, Sir Edward Coke.
To understand Dr. Bonham's Case 130 one must understand Lord Coke,
said to be the greatest of all English judges. 131 (The name is pronounced
"Cook," which led to some derisive punning.) 132 He was Attorney General
121. Dr. Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 639.
122. 1 G. CLARK, supra note 28, at 42.
123. Id. at 42, 50; 4 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 1, at 29.
124. E. CHEYNEY, A SHORT HISTORY OF ENGLAND 290-91, 294-96 (1945).
125. 1 G. CLARK, supra note 28, at 58.
126. Dr. Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 639.
127. 77 Eng. Rep. at 641, 656.
128. G. ELTON, THE TUDOR CONSTITUTION 233-34 (1962); F. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENG-
LAND LAW IN SELECTED HISTORICAL ESSAYS 114 (H. Cam. ed. 1957).
129. 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (C.P. 1609).
130. Id.
131. Goodhart, English Contributions to the Philosophy of Law, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 671,
674 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Goodhart].
132. Coke's second wife, Elizabeth, the relickt of Sir William Hatton, was with child
when he married her; laying his hand on her belly (when he came to her bed) and
finding a child to stirre, What, sayd he, Flesh in the Pott. Yea, quoth she, or else I
would not have married a Cooke.
C. BOWEN, THE LION AND THE THRONE 125, 390 (1957) [hereinafter cited as C. BOWEN].
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for Elizabeth I, Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas, Chief Justice
of the King's Bench, member of Parliament, and a legal writer whose
influence yet endures. In his personal life he was an "unpleasant, hard,
grasping, arrogant and thoroughly difficult man, of whom his widow, after
thirty-six years of married life could write. . . 'We shall never see his like
again praise be to God." 1 33 Coke "never had misgivings about certitude, at
least his own certitude," and "quite innocently put his own concepts back
into the past before he began to look for them and, not surprisingly, he
found them." ' 134 Therefore, reading his reports we must beware of a
"cooked account.' 135 A partial set of his Reports travelled over on the
Mayflower, his "Revised Version of the Common Law," and some of his
ideas "have taken firmer root abroad than they have at home."'136
In his public life he hoped to subject both the Crown and Parliament to a
paramount common law. 137 In Coke's sense the common law was above
both the King and Parliament and defined their respective functions. "The
devotion which the American feels for the federal Constitution is in 17th
Century England felt for the common law because it is the Englishman's
constitutional shield against tyranny."' 138 Coke used Bonham's Case to
assert his theory. He was unsuccessful at home, but his opinion remains as a
landmark of American constitutional law. Although it has long since lost
any special medical significance, it is important in this article because it is
the first reported case involving the College of Physicians. 139
Catherine Drinker Bowen, Lord Coke's most popular biographer, de-
scribes Bonham's Case as "piddling, almost farcical."140 Professor Louis
Jaffe of the Harvard Law School calls it "great."' 4 ' They are both right.
Doctor Thomas Bonham, a graduate of Cambridge with the "degree and
dignity of a doctor in physic," failed the examination of the College of
Physicians but proceeded to practice medicine in London without a license
from the College. The College, acting through its president and "censors or
governors" had him imprisoned in the "Compter, London in the Poultry,"
(sometimes called the "Counter," a debtors prison, not a shelf in a hen
house) and "evilly treated. . . him there so in prison for a long time, that is
to say, by the space of seven days."'142 He brought an action for 300 pounds
133. Thorne, Sir Edward Coke 1552-1952, in SELDEN SOCIETY LECTURE 1952 at 3, 4 (1954)
[hereinafter cited as Thorne].
134. Sayles, The Court of King's Bench in Law and History, in SELDEN SOCIETY LECTURE
1959 at 3, 5.
135. Id.
136. G. HASKINS, LAW AND AUTHORITY IN EARLY MASSACHUSETTS, 118, 123, 135, 231
(1968); Sayles, The Court of King's Bench in Law and History, in SELDEN SOCIETY LECTURE
1959 at 4; Thorne, supra note 133, at 4.
137. C. BOWEN, supra note 132, at 291-306; T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 25, at 337 (5th ed.
1956).
138. Goodhart, supra note 131, at 675.
139. 77 Eng. Rep. at 658.
140. C. BOWEN, supra note 132, at 309.
141. Jaffe, Judicial Review: Constitutional and Jurisdictional Fact, 70 HARV. L. REV. 953
(1957).
142. Dr. Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (C.P. 1609).
124
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against the president and censors for false imprisonment and recovered a
judgment, even though this was in the days when a pound was worth a
pound and Coke's annual salary as Chief Justice of Common Pleas was only
206 pounds, 19 shillings and tuppence. 14
3
The obvious question was whether a "doctor in physic" graduated from
Oxford or Cambridge needed a license from the College.1" But this obvious
.question was not answered for ninety years when the King's Bench held that
even a university graduate must be licensed to practice in London.
145
Instead Coke by-passed the obvious and proceeded to an interpretation of
the Charter and the Act of 1522, which he held gave the Censors authority to
imprison only for malpractice but not for unlicensed practice. For the latter
they could only impose a fine, which they must collect by legal proceedings
because they were not a court. 146 Although not stated in the opinion, by
holding the Censors were not a court they lost the benefit of the ancient rule
that judicial officers are not personally liable for the erroneous exercise of
judicial powers, 47 and they thus became liable for false imprisonment.
So far the case was "piddling." Now why is the case great? It is great for
two reasons: (1) it is the source of the American concept that courts can
declare statutes unconstitutional; and (2) it is unconstitutional to require a
person to proceed before a judge who has a personal interest in t he outcome
of the case. The charter and statute provided that one-half of the fines for
unlicensed practice should be paid to the College and the other half to the
king. This division gave the Censors a motive to levy, fines to benefit the
College, and it violated the maxim, as old as the Year Books, "No man
shall be a judge in his own case." 148
Coke, by way of dictum, went out of his way to declare the statutory
division void. "And it appears in our books, that in many cases, the
143. There are at least two reports of the case, the one in 8 Coke's Rep. 107a, 113b, 77 Eng.
Rep. 638, 646 (1609 and 1610), and the other-in 2 Brownlow & Goldesborough 256, 123 Eng.
Rep. 928 (1609), sub nom. College of Physician's case. I have used Coke's report, because it is
more complete and more colorful. Coke's salary is given in Thorne, supra note 133, at 8. A
trivial but striking example of the dangers of using secondary authorities is illustrated by the
place of Bonham's imprisonment. Coke gives it as the Compter in the Poultry. 77 Eng. Rep. at
644, 645. Plucknett says Bonham was committed to the "Counter of Fleet Street." Plucknett,
Bonham's Case and Judicial Review, 40 HARV. L. REV. 30, 32 (1926). Plucknett's error is
repeated in Thorne, Dr. Bonham's Case, 54 L.Q. REV. 543 (1938) and in C. BOWEN, supra note
132, at 315. But "[tlo the Counter in the Poultry he went." 1 G. CLARK, supra note 28, at 209.
The Compter and the Fleet were two different institutions. W. KENT, AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
LONDON 259, 454 (1951). Clark says that the judgement was for only 40 pounds and that the
College paid the costs of the litigation so that no expense should fall on the officers in whose
names it was conducted. I G. CLARK, supra note 28, at 213. Without access to the original
records I have not been able to verify these statements.
144. 77 Eng. Rep. at 645.
145. College of Physicians v. Levett, 91 Eng. Rep. 1214 (K.B. 1699).
146. 77 Eng. Rep. at 651, 655, 657.
147. Groenvelt v. Burwell, 91 Eng. Rep. 1202, 1211-12 (K.B. 1699-1700); cf. Westlake
Community Hosp. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 465, 483, 551 P.2d 410, 420-21, 131 Cal. Rptr.
90, 100-01 (1976) (malicious prosecution); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §890, Comment d (1939). See
generally 4 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts §§168, 169, at 2456-59 (8th ed.
1974).
148. 77 Eng. Rep. at 641, 652. 14 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 1, at 199.
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common law will controul Acts of Parliament, and sometimes adjudge them
to be utterly void." 149
Although this is said to have been the most controversial dictum of
Coke's life, it was received by his contemporaries "with complacency if not
indifference." 5 ° That one should not be a judge in his own case was argued
as a principle of "natural justice" and so accepted by Chief Justice Holt
ninety years later. Holt appeared to think Coke meant what he said and said
it correctly:
And what my Lord Coke says in Dr. Bonham's case in his 8 Co. is
far from any extravagancy, for it is a very reasonable and true
saying, that if an Act of Parliament should ordain that the same
person should be both party and Judge, or, which is the same
thing, Judge in his own cause, it would be a void Act of Parlia-
ment; for it is impossible that one should be Judge and party, ...
and an Act of Parliament can do no wrong, though it may do
several things that look pretty odd. . .. 151
Much scholarship has since been expended on showing that Coke either
had no authority for what he said about holding Acts of Parliament void, or
did not mean what he appeared to say, and that the appeal to "natural
justice" as a basis for authority to void an Act is groundless. 52 And we now
know that Coke's dictum that the common law could control an Act of
Parliament is not supportable.1 53 As principle of English Constitutional law
it is nonsense attributed to "his usual vehemence and even more than his
usual inaccuracy," ' 154 or, more charitably, to the later development of the
modem conceptions of parliamentary sovereignty. 155
Coke's dictum, however, took root in America. Here it "raised a harvest
of political theory which was destined to be the food of far-distant states to
which he had never given a thought.' 1 56 The royal governor of Mas-
sachusetts cited the dictum against the Stamp Act in 1765.157 James Otis and
149. 77 Eng. Rep. at 652.
150. C. BOWEN, supra note 132, at 316.
151. City of London v. Wood, 88 Eng. Rep 1592, 1602 (K.B. 1699).
152. G. ELTON, THE TUDOR CONSTITUTION 234 (1972); T. PLUCKNETr, supra note 25; S.
THORNE, A DISCLOSURE UPON THE EXPOSICION & UNDERSTANDINGE OF STATUTES 79 n. 165, 86,
91 (1942); Thorne, supra note 133, at 3-4.
153. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 531 (1884); Goodhart, supra note 131, at 675.
154. F. POLLOCK, A FIRST BOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE 266 (4th ed. 1918).
155. S. THORNE, A DISCLOSURE UPON THE EXPOSICION & UNDERSTANDINGE OF STATUTES 92(1942); Goodhart, supra note 131, at 675; Albert Venn Dicey, whose book on the English
Constitution was standard for years, after contradicting Coke out of his own later writings
summarized the English law:
in a grotesque expression which has become almost proverbial. 'It is a fundamental
principle with English lawyers, that Parliament can do everything but make a woman
a man, and a man a woman.'
Dicey wrote in 1902. What would he say in the light of present surgical virtuosity? A. DICEY,
supra note 39, at 40-41; T. PLUCKNE1-r, supra note 25, at 337. Plucknett gives a tantalizing
reference, which I have not been able to check, "It was easier to make a woman a man. I Mary,
Sess. 3, C.A, S.3." T. PLUCKNETr, supra note 25, at 337.
156. Plucknett, Bonham's Case and Judicial Review, 40 HARV. L. REV. 30, 30-31 (1926).
157. C. BOWEN, supra note 132, at 316.
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Patrick Henry extolled it. 158 And William Cushing, later appointed to the
Supreme Court of the United States by George Washington, relied on it in
1776 to persuade a grand jury to declare an Act of Parliament "void and
inoperative." 1 59 Cushing's friend, John Adams, congratulated him for do-
ing so:
You have my hearty concurrence in telling the jury the nullity of
the Acts of Parliament, whether we can prove it by the jus gladii
[the law of the sword] or not. I am determined to die of that
opinion, let the jus gladii say what it will.'60
Chancellor Kent of New York, the acknowledged leader of the American
bench and bar of his day, wrote in 1826, "[w]e cannot but admire the
intrepidity and powerful sense" of Lord Coke in uttering this dictum. 161 Dr.
Bonham's Case62 thus became a principal source of American Constitu-
tional theory, although it has since been superseded by our written constitu-
tions. 163
The proposition that no man can be a judge in his own case has survived
in England as a principle of "natural justice"164 and in the United States as a
fundamental requirement of that "due process of law" required by the
Constitution. It is alive and flourishing in the United States Supreme
Court. 165 The California Supreme Court applied it to invalidate the former
statute prohibiting abortions "unless the same is necessary to preserve [the
woman's] life.' 166 This, in effect, delegated to the physician the duty to
determine if the abortion was necessary. If he decided wrongly, he was
subject to a criminal penalty if he performed the abortion, but he was under
no penalty if he did not. Thus, there was enormous pressure on the physician
to make his decision turn on his own penal interest rather than on the welfare
of the woman. Such delegation of authority to decide to a person directly
involved in the results of the decision was held, under the fourteenth
amendment, to violate due process. 67 The California court relied on Tumey
158. C. BOWEN, supra note 132, at 316-17.
159. Plucknett, Bonham's Case and Judicial Review, 40 HARV. L. REV. 30, 64 (1926).
160. T. PLUCKNETr, supra note 25, at 64.
161. Grant, The "Higher Law" Background of the Law of Eminent Domain, 6 Wis. L.
REv. 67, 72 n.25 (1931), citing I J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 420 (1826).
162. 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (C.P. 1609).
163. E. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 141-42 (Athaneum ed.
1963); Grant, The "Higher Law" Background of the Law of Eminent Domain, 6 Wis. L. REV.
67, 68, n.5 (1931).
164. A. DICEY, supra note 39, at 356-57; D. HEWITr, NATURAL JUSTICE 17-19 (1972)
(collecting the English cases); 14 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 1, at 199. Parliament could
change this principle if it were so disposed. F. POLLOCK, A FIRST BOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE 268-
69 (4th ed. 1918).
165. Concerned Citizens v. Pine Creek Conservancy Dist., 429 U.S. 651, 652 (1977);
Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245, 249 (1977); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 197 (1974)
(citing Bonham); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 524 (1927) (citing Bonham).
166. CAL. STATS. 1967, c. 327, §3, at 1523, held invalid in People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954,
972-73, 458 P.2d 194, 206, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 366 (1969).
167. People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 972-73, 458 P.2d 194, 206, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 366
(1969).
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v. Ohio, 168 which, in turn, had relied on Dr. Bonham's Case, and thus
Coke's dictum not only has influenced states Coke never thought of but
produced results he may have abhorred.
Coke could recognize good medical advice. In the margin of his copy of
Thomas Paynell's Regimen of Health he rhymed a Latin prescription into
English:
"If physicke fayle
For thy advayle,
Three Doctors you shall find,
Doctor due diet
And Doctor Quiet
And Doctor merry-mynde." 169
But in Dr. Bonham's Case Coke surrendered his medical common sense to
his loyalty to his old school, Trinity College at Cambridge, for which he
"kept a warm affection" and which he served as High Steward.170 There
was a degree of tension between the universities and the College of Physi-
cians, 171 and Coke went out of his way to extol them and disparage the
College:
The university is a ma mater, from whose breasts those of that
private college have sucked all their science and knowledge...
and, therefore, those universities exceed and excel all private
colleges. 172
But early in its history the College undertook teaching, although this was
not one of the functions authorized by the Charter. 173 And the physicians
sucked little from the "firm classical breast of Alma Mater." The univer-
sities remained closed to "new methods such as anatomical dissection long
after the Royal College, in William Harvey's person, uncovered the
heart." 174 The great Doctor Caius taught at Cambridge, but he had to
perform his dissections at the College in London. The university considered
such practices atheistical and the "business of mechanics, artisans, surgeons
who worked with their hands . . . . For scholars it was enough to know
that the body was regulated by the four humors .... -175 Coke's panegyr-
ic of the universities expedited the passage of Dr. Bonham's Case to
medical oblivion. Clark says that "[t]he judgment was reversed by writ of
error in the king's bench., 176 Actually, Dr. Bonham's Case was partially
overruled, rather than reversed.
168. 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
169. C. BOWEN, supra note 132, at 532.
170. C. BOWEN, supra note 132, at 58.
171. 1 G. CLARK, supra note 28, at 209, 112-13.
172. 77 Eng. Rep. at 650.
173. 1 G. CLARK, supra note 28, at 52.
174. C. BOWEN, supra note 132, at 317.
175. C. BOWEN, supra note 132, at 56.
176. 1 G. CLARK, supra note 28, at 213. Clark does not document his statement, and I have
not been able to verify it. It is contradicted by Coke himself, who says the Chief Justice of the
King's Bench "well approved of the judgement we had. . . given." 77 Eng. Rep. at 658.
128
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In Dr. Bonham's Case Coke had held that the Censors were not a court
and, therefore, the Censors' findings of fact on the evidence could be
"traversed," that is, denied and the facts tried again before a court. This
holding was overruled in Groenvelt v. Burwel 77 in 1699 or 1700 by Chief
Justice Holt. Groenvelt was imprisoned by the Censors for twelve weeks for
malpractice, the administration "of unwholesome and noxious pills." 178 On
his release he brought an action for false imprisonment, as Bonham had,
relying on Coke's statement that he could attack the findings of fact of the
Censors. Holt held that the Censors' findings could not be traversed,
because they were a court. Since they were not a common-law court,
however, their findings could not be reviewed by the customary appeal or
writ of error, but could be reviewed only by common law certiorari. 179 On
review by certiorari the Court would determine only whether the Censors
had acted within their "jurisdiction." Actually, "jurisdiction" is virtually
undefinable in the present context. The California Supreme Court says: "the
concept [lack of jurisdiction] encompasses any error of sufficient magnitude
that the trial court may be said to have acted in excess of jurisdiction.' '180
The House of Lords says certiorari may be used to nullify an order on "the
ground which without any great precision has been described as a departure
from 'natural justice."' 18 But whatever "jurisdiction" means, the Censors
had it, therefore Groenvelt could not show the Court that he had in fact not
been guilty of malpractice, and he lost his case.
By way of assigning reasons for the fact that Groenvelt could not attack
the findings of fact of the Censors, Holt put a hypothetical situation: If the
finding of malpractice could be attacked in a common-law court, the issue of
malpractice would have to be tried to a jury, and this would be nonsense:
"For the judges themselves do not understand medicines sufficiently to
make a judgment. Whether they were sound or not." 182
An analogous preference for expertise and reluctance to submit issues of
medical discipline to juries appears in a California case decided last sum-
177. 91 Eng. Rep. 1202 (K.B. 1699); S.C. sub nom. Grenville v. College of Physicians, 88
Eng. Rep. 1398 (K.B. 1700). There are at least five other reports of the case under various
spellings of the plaintiff's name. 2 G. CLARK, supra note 28, at 453 n.5. The defendant, Dr.
Thomas Burwell, was President of the College in 1692. 2 G. CLARK, supra note 28, at 734.
178. See note 177 supra.
179. Common law certiorari is an order directing an inferior court to certify its record to a
reviewing court. It is not the federal statutory procedure now used to obtain a discretionary
review by the United States Supreme Court. The only similarity between the two is the name.
180. In re Sands, 18 Cal. 3d 851, 857, 558 P.2d 863, 866, 135 Cal. Rptr. 777,780 (1977). See
also General Medical Council v. Spackman, [1943] A.C. 627, 640;
Alice felt dreadfully puzzled. The Hatter's remark seemed to her to have no sort of
meaning in it, and yet it was certainly English. 'I don't quite understand you, she
said, as politely as she could.'
M. GARDNER, THE ANNOTATED ALICE 97 (1960). "The weakness of the jurisdictional fact
concept of review has been the lack of an adequate logic for distinguishing jurisdictional facts
from other facts." Jaffe, Judicial Review: Constitutional and Jurisdictional Fact, 70 HARV. L.
REV. 953, 959 (1957).
181. General Medical Council v. Spackman, [1943] A.C. 627, 640.
182. 91 Eng. Rep. at 1213-14.
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mer. 183 Of course, complicated medical questions are tried routinely to
juries in the malpractice cases seeking damages for personal injuries. But in
the discipline cases, which may involve identical questions, juries are
somewhat discountenanced. This paradox is explained by the history of the
forms of legal proceedings and not by logic. "The life of the law has not
been logic: it has been experience." 184
In California, for reasons unrelated to the practice of medicine, there is
another seeming paradox. Here certiorari is no longer available to review the
action of medical licensing agencies. The appropriate vehicle is now a writ
of mandate.185 This has resulted in a change from the test of "lack of
jurisdiction" to "abuse of discretion." In determining whether there has
been an abuse of discretion by the licensing agency, the trial judge may
exercise his independent judgment on the evidence.186 "Thus the ultimate
power of decision rests with the trial court." ' 187 This is not because the
California Supreme Court necessarily has more confidence in the ability of
trial judges to understand the soundness of conclusions from medical evi-
dence than did Lord Holt. It is because of profound public policy. The Court
adopted Jaffe's rationale of its position:
As Professor Jaffe, a leading authority in the field of administra-
tive law has written: 'The California rule can be justified in so far
as it gives additional procedural protection to an interest of great
importance as where a professional license has been revoked. The
protection may be more needed to overcome likely prejudices of a
professional licensing body against maverick and unconventional
practitioners. '88
The California Supreme Court thus deliberately protects the rights of "the
independent thinker or crusader" who may be subjected "to the retaliation
of the professional or trade group,"' 189 and says:
Restricted to the narrow ground of review of the [sufficiency of
the] evidence and denied the power of an independent analysis,
the court might well be unable to save the unpopular professional
or practitioner. 190
183. Westlake Community Hosp. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 465,484, 551 P.2d 410, 421,
131 Cal. Rptr. 90, 101 (1976).
184. 0. HOLMES, supra note 10, at 1.
185. Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal. 3d 130, 138,481 P.2d 242, 247, 93 Cal. Rptr. 234, 239 (1971).
186. See id. at 139, 481 P.2d at 248, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 240; cf. Strumsky v. San Diego County
Employees Retirement Ass'n, 11 Cal. 3d 28, 32, 520 P.2d 29, 31, 112 Cal. Rptr. 805, 807 (1974)
(applying-the Bixby rule to decisions of the Board of a County Employees Retirement Associa-
tion).
187. Yakov v. Board of Medical Examiners, 68 Cal. 2d 67, 72, 435 P.2d 553, 556, 64 Cal.
Rptr. 785, 788 (1968); Hohreiter v. Garrison, 81 Cal. App. 2d 384,402, 184 P.2d 323,334 (1947),
quoted in, Moran v. Board of Medical Examiners, 32 Cal. 2d 301, 308, 196 P.2d 20, 25 (1948).
188. Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal. 3d 130, 145, 481 P.2d 242, 252-53, 93 Cal. Rptr. 234, 244-45
(1971). The court was referring to L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 191-
92 (1965).
189. Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal. 3d at 146-47, 481 P.2d 254, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 246.
190. Id. at 147, 481 P.2d at 254, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 246; cf. Patty v. Board of Medical
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This is the local counterpart of the preservation of the English "rule of law"
praised by Dicey, which Holdsworth says would be abrogated were the
courts ousted and administrative officials given sole jurisdiction over ques-
tions of a justiciable kind.191
In Groenvelt v. Burwel1 92 Holt not only overruled Coke, he went out of
his way to ridicule him. Despite his almost contemporaneous praise in City
of London v. Wood193 of Coke's dictum on holding statutes void as no
extravagance, 194 in Groenvelt Holt took Coke to task for his praise of the
universities. Holt said that in Dr. Bonham's Case:
Coke was transported [that is, carried out of his mind by strong
emotion] that [because] the doctor was a member of the univer-
sity, and of his own [Coke's] university (as one may see by his
excursions in praise of it) which he looked upon as affronted by
that prosecution. And as the said opinion was not judicial, so it has
no authority in law for its foundation. 195
Why was Holt so derogatory of Coke? And why was he so zealous to
maintain the authority of the Censors? At this time we can only guess. Holt
may have only been protecting an old client. Before he ascended to the
King's Bench, Holt had been "standing counsel" to the Royal College of
Physicians. 196
That "eminently readable but biased" biographer, Lord Campbell, of
whom "it was said that his biographies added a new terror to death," 197
gives us another clue. Holt may have had a personal reason to want to
maintain the authority of the College of Physicians. Holt's wife, Anne
Cropley,
was a shrew, and they lived together on the worst possible terms.
She fell into ill health and he was in high hopes of getting rid of
her. To plague her husband she insisted on consulting a physician
with whom he had had a personal quarrel, and who, for this reason
is said to have taken peculiar pains in curing her. 198
The doctor was John Radcliffe. He had been fined by the Censors for
improper association with an apothecary, expelled from his fellowship in the
College in 1689, and consulting with him had been made an offense
punishable by a fine of 10 pounds.199 Radcliffe refused to obey the statute of
Examiners, 9 Cal. 3d 356, 366, 508 P.2d 1121, 1127-28, 107 Cal. Rptr. 473,479-80 (1973) (abuses
of governmental power).
191. A. DICEY, supra note 39, at 191-93; 14 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 1, at 203.
192. 91 Eng. Rep. 1202 (K.B. 1699-1700).
193. 88 Eng. Rep. 1592 (K.B. 1699).
194. City of London v. Wood, 88 Eng. Rep. 1592, 1602 (K.B. 1699).
195. 91 Eng. Rep. at 1212; 88 Eng. Rep. at 1400.
196. 1 G. CLARK, supra note 28, at 367; G. CLARK, supra note 28, at 451.
197. G. WILLIAMS, LEARNING THE LAW 168 (3d ed. 1950). The quip was said to have been
originated by Dr. John Arbuthnot more than a century and a half before Lord Campbell. F.
MUIR, AN IRREVERENT AND THOROUGHLY INCOMPLETE SOCIAL HISTORY OF ALMOST EVERY-
THING 128 (1976).
198. 2 J. CAMPBELL, LIVES OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES 177 (1861).
199. 1 G. CLARK, supra note 28, at 471.
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the College providing that directions on prescriptions should not be written
in Latin. He prescribed in Latin and thus made the apothecary an inter-
mediary between himself and the patient.2°0 In modern terms he seems to
have been in violation of California Business and Professions Code Section
2392 by aiding an unlicensed person to practice medicine.
Eventually, Radcliffe submitted "with his usual bad grace" and was
restored to his fellowship. He became so rich and such a medical benefactor
that his gold-headed cane was treasured by the College as a symbol of
medical excellence.201 And it remains such a symbol to this day, witness the
award of a gold-headed cane to the outstanding student in the graduating
class at the Medical School of the University of California at San Francisco.
But it is easy to see why Holt may have disliked Radcliffe and how Holt
developed his attitudes favorable to the College. There is an old Latin
maxim emblazoned on the walls of the Harvard Law Library, "Non sub
homine sed sub deo et lege," we are to be governed not by men but by God
and law. 20 2 Consider what Holt said of Coke and what we know of Holt and
realize that this remains as a goal to aspire to, not a statement of an
achievement.
Holt's efforts to support the College of Physicians were eventually unsuc-
cessful. The College became involved in a running battle with the surgeons
and apothecaries over educational requirements and monopolistic practices.
Public sentiment was against the College, and it lost in the House of
Lords. 203 The result was that apothecaries were able to practice medicine,
and, despite the apparent victory in Groenvelt's Case, the College of
Physicians does not seem to have concerned itself with malpractice thereaf-
ter except for one fleeting reference to malpractice by an occulist. 2°4 The
situation became so bad that in 1858 the retiring president of the California
State Medical Society said: "London has been styled the paradise of
quacks." 20 5
This lack of concern of the principal licensing agency with malpractice
continued even after the passage of the first comprehensive licensing statute,
the Medical Act of 1858.20 The Act provided that the name of a doctor
could be "erased" from the register of practitioners if the Medical Council
found him guilty "of infamous Conduct in any professional Respect." 20 7
The reported cases under this provision deal with such things as assisting an
unlicensed person to practice as a "medical electrician"; improper advertis-
200. 1 G. CLARK, supra note 28, at 734.
201. 1 G. CLARK, supra note 28, at 359-60; 2 G. CLARK, supra note 28, at 436, 437, 471.
202. See, e.g., C. BOWEN, supra note 132, at 305, says the maxim goes back to Bracton,
circa 1250; 2 BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 33 (S.E. Thorne, ed. 1968).
203. 1 G. CLARK, supra note 28, at 361, 366; 2 G. CLARK, supra note 28, at 476-79.
204. 1 G. CLARK, supra note 28, at 363.
205. R. JONES, MEMORIES, MEN AND MEDICINE 52 (1950) [hereinafter cited as R. JONES].
206. 21 & 22 Vict., C. 90 (1858).
207. Id. at 306.
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ing; performing an illegal abortion; adultery with a female patient; slander;
having a bastard child; or publishing an indecent book. 20 8 But of malprac-
tice, in the sense of failing to treat a patient in accordance with the standard
of care, not a word have I found.
General Medical Council v. Spackman2 9 is a good illustration of the
elusiveness of "natural justice." Spackman was a physician who committed
adultery with a female patient. He was named as a party in the ensuing
divorce suit and held liable for 1000 pounds. Thereafter the Council pro-
ceeded against him under the Medical Act of 1858 on the grounds that he
had been guilty of professional misconduct. Under the statute the Council
had authority "not merely to ascertain the facts, but also to decide what
standard to apply and whether to hold that particular conduct is infam-
ous . . . 'in any professional respect.' "210 The Council refused to allow
Spackman to present evidence refuting the "prima facie" case made at the
divorce trial. Of course, this refusal to allow Spackman to "traverse" the
divorce proceeding seems in accord with Holt's ruling in Groenvelt.
Nevertheless, the House of Lords held that the refusal to allow Spackman to
present such evidence was a denial of "natural justice." Their Lordships
recognized the inconvenience of retrying the divorce case before the General
Medical Council but disposed of it with a truism: "Convenience and justice
are often not on speaking terms. "211 They invited Parliament to change the
law, and Parliament did so in the Medical Act of 1956 by making the
matrimonial proceeding conclusive. 212 Thus, not only can Parliament
change "natural justice," it did so, and some 300 years after Coke's death it
drove another nail into his coffin and resurrected Holt.
The history of the California legislation regulating medical practice shows
some parallels to that of the first general English Act, that of 1858. We can
infer that some of the California doctors knew of the English experience.,
e.g., the reference in 1856 to examination by a "Board of Censors" as a
qualification for admission to the State Medical Society.213 In California, as
208. Ong Bak Hin v. General Medical Council, [1946] 2 All. E.R. 257; General Medical
Council v. Spackman, [1943] A.C. 627, 635, 643; Rex. v. General Council of Medical Educ.,
[1930] 1 K.B. 562; Leeson v. General Council of Medical Educ., 43 Ch.D. 366 (1889).
209. [1943] A.C. 627.
210. Id.
211. [1943] A.C. at 638. "[S]peed is not always compatible with justice." In re Marriage of
Brantner, 67 Cal. App. 3d 416, 422, 136 Cal. Rptr. 635, 638 (1977).
212. 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 76; 21 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND §33, (2) at 654 (3d ed. 1970).
Another example of Parliament changing a rule of "natural justice" is the statute allowing
parties to testify in their own law suits. 17 HALSBURY'S LAW OF ENGLAND 231 at 162 (4th ed.
1976). As late as 1823 it was argued that the old rule forbidding parties to testify on the a priori
assumption they would lie on their own behalf was argued to be a principle of "natural justice."
Stewart v. Lawton, 130 Eng. Rep. 151 (C.P. 1823). But the court evaded the issue on the ground
that the statute there involved had never been applied. Compare 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 194-95 (3d ed. 1944) with T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 25, at 339.
Plucknett's description is not quite accurate.
213. R. JONES, supra note 205, at 41. Similar references can be found in New York. See
Reid v. Medical Soc'y, 156 N.Y.S. 780, 781 (Sup. Ct. 1915).
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in England, legislation requiring the licensing of apothecaries preceded the
licensing of physicians. Indeed one of the arguments in favor of the first
California Medical Act was: "why, if the sale of poison was amenable to
control, the men who prescribed it should not be under similar scrutiny." 214
The original legislation was secured only after intense debate within the
medical profession both in England and California. 215 And when the Act
was finally passed in California, like the English Act, it presupposed "the
existence of strong voluntary associations side by side, with the official
machine.' '216
The first California Medical Act, that of 1876,217 provided for a Board of
Examiners appointed by the several medical societies then in existence, and
gave the Board authority to grant certificates and to revoke them for
"unprofessional or dishonorable conduct." The certificate entitled the
holder to "append to his name the letters of 'M.D."' The act actually
provided for the licensing of itinerant vendors of drugs and nostrums and,
although it was once known as "The Law to Prevent Quackery," was
ineffective and repeatedly amended over the opposition of those who
thought no law would be better.2 Is
The scheme of composing the examining board of representatives of
various medical societies or "schools" of medicine such as "Homeopaths"
or "Eclectics" was eventually held constitutional. 219 But from the begin-
ning the early legislation was subjected to the same sort of "niggardly
exposition" that seems to fiave required the enactment of the statute of
Queen Mary requiring gaolers to receive the prisoners of the old College of
Physicians. In Ex parte McNulty ° the court held that a physician whose
license had been revoked could continue to practice. The Act of 1876 made
it a misdemeanor to practice "without first having procured a certificate."
McNulty had once procured a certificate and, since the Act said nothing
about the effect of revoking a certificate, was, therefore, not guilty of a
misdemeanor. 221 Thus, when we find that the current statute requires a
physician to have a "valid, unrevoked certificate,''222 we know that the
214. R. JONES, supra note 205, at 118. On the English Apothecaries Act of 1815 see 2 G.
CLARK, supra note 28, at 647-50.
215. Compare R. JONES, supra note 205, at 100-18 with 2 G. CLARK, supra note 28, at 718
passim.
216. 2 G. CLARK, supra note 28, at 730.
217. CAL. STATS. 1875, c. 518, §2, at 792.
218. R. JONES, supra note 205, at 119-20. In re Gerber, 57 Cal. App. 141,206 P. 1004 (1922)
reviews some of the early legislation. Its holding that a "naturopath" could practice optometry
was disapproved in Millsap v. Alderson, 63 Cal. App. 518, 219 P. 469 (1923), as explained in
Hall v. Steele, 193 Cal. 602, 226 P. 854 (1924), holding that a "naturopath" or so-called "beauty
doctor" could not practice plastic surgery.
219. Ex parte Gerino, 143 Cal. 412, 77 P. 166 (1904); Packer v. Board of Behavioral
Examiners, 52 Cal. App. 3d 190, 196, 125 Cal. Rptr. 96, 100 (1975); Jaffe, Law Making by
Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REV. 201, 229-34 (1937).
220. 77 Cal. 164, 19 P. 237 (1888).
221. Id. at 167-68, 19 P. at 239.
222. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §2141.
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word "unrevoked" was not inserted out of some lawyer's abundance of
caution. It was inserted to meet a real need. 223
Ex parte McNulty224 has a significance beyond its actual holding. The
provision in Section 10 of the Act of 1876 that gave the Board of Examiners
authority to refuse or revoke certificates for "unprofessional or dishonorable
conduct" would seem to be a delegation of legislative power to further
define the conduct. General Medical Council v. Spackman225 and some
states have upheld such delegations. 226 But in McNulty the California
Supreme Court cast doubt on the validity of such a delegation of authority to
an administrative agency. It was disturbed by the fact that the early boards
represented various "schools" of medicine,22 7 and when one of the justices
made a particular point of lauding Dr. Hahnemann, the founder of the
homeopathic school,228 the handwriting was on the wall.
The result was that the legislature had to include various definitions of
"unprofessional conduct." But even this was not enough, and judicial
hostility to the delegation of the definition continued. When "unprofession-
al conduct" was defined by statute to include "[a]ll advertising of medical
business in which grossly improbable statements are made,''229 the court
held a physician licensed by the Eclectic Medical Society could not have her
certificate revoked for advertising: "Cancer Cured. The Mrs. S. J. Bridge
Remedy, the only sure cure known in the world.' '230 The court reasoned, if
that is the correct word, that the statement might be grossly improbable but
nevertheless true; that one board might find the statement merely improb-
able but not grossly so; that since different schools were represented on the
board, the practitioners of a minority school might be the victims of
invidious discrimination; and that it was "an easy matter for the legislature
to declare what statements. . . shall be deemed 'grossly improbable' and it
must do so, and not leave it to a board of medical examiners after pub-
lication ... ."231
And the courts still subject to strict scrutiny any statute that restricts the
right to work for a living in a common occupation, particularly where the
licensing authority is delegated to persons who are themselves subject to the
223. An intensive search might disclose the reasons for much of the current legislative
language, but I have not been able to find that it has been done. The composition and difficulties
of the early boards are outlined in H. HARRIS, CALIFORNIA'S MEDICAL STORY 203-07 (1932), but
their legal problems are glossed over by general references to "the doubtful constitutionality of
the laws," id. at 203, and "bad as it [the law] was, the courts had distorted it further until
California had become the medical dumping ground of the nation .. " Id. at 205. The early
boards had to solicit doctors for funds to enforce the law and the litigation defending it. R.
JONES, supra note 205, at 122, 139.
224. 77 Cal. 164, 19 P. 237 (1888).
225. [1943] A.C. 637.
226. Annot., 28 A.L.R. 3d 487 (1969); but see RIBICOFF REPORT, supra note 5, at 908-09.
227. 77 Cal. at 170, 19 P. at 240 (Paterson, J., concurring).
228. Id. at 169, 19 P. at 240 (Thornton, J., concurring).
229. Hewitt v. Board of Medical Examiners, 148 Cal. 590, 591, 84 P. 39, 40 (1908).
230. Id.
231. Id. at 595, 84 P. at 41.
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authority delegated. 232 The most extreme example related to the present
context seems to be that of the statute that once made five years of
experience in this state or five years of licensure in another state prerequi-
sites to obtaining a license as a dispensing optician. Neither standards of
experience in California nor standards for judging the licensing elsewhere
were stated. The California Supreme Court in Blumenthal v. Board of
Medical Examiners233 invalidated the statute as a device to give "presently
licensed dispensing opticians . . . virtually absolute economic control over
those employees who are required to serve under them in order to attain
future professional objectives." 234 The citation of Blumenthal in juxtaposi-
tion to Tumey v. Ohio235 in People v. Belous 2 36 shows how close the subject
of regulation of doctors by doctors can come to the constitutional problems
raised by decisions made by persons interested in the result. And the
circumspection with which the California Supreme Court has regarded
disciplinary agencies is shown by its holding that the Board of Medical
Examiners may not entrap a licensee into selling drugs and then prosecute
him. To allow an agency which has both investigatory and adjudicatory
powers (Lord Holt's "judge and party") to engage in entrapment "is to
invite the appearance and danger of abuse and discrimination.' '237
There are indications that the courts may be becoming somewhat less
stringent in the professional licensing cases and are less ready to apply the
so-called "strict scrutiny" standard to invalidate statutes under the Equal
Protection Clause. 238 And they may now be more amenable to delegation of
authority to a licensing agency to define the grounds of discipline. Thus, it
has been held that the Board of Examiners in Veterinary Medicine could
discipline a licensee on the statutory ground, among others, for "conduct
reflecting unfavorably on the profession of veterinary medicine.' '239 The
court conceded that the quoted language "fails on its face to provide a
standard by which conduct can be uniformly judged."'' 4 But despite its
uncertainty it was held constitutional, "since this case pertains to a particu-
lar vocation, the common knowledge of the members of veterinary medicine
232. Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 16-17, 485 P.2d 529, 538-39, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329,
338-39 (1971); see Antonine v. Department of Pub. Health, 33 Cal. App. 3d 215, 226-28, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 689, 696-97 (1973).
233. 57 Cal. 2d 228, 368 P.2d 101, 18 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1962).
234. Id. at 236, 368 P.2d at 105, 18 Cal. Rptr. at 505.
235. 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
236. See note 167 supra.
237. Patty v. Board of Medical Examiners, 9 Cal. 3d 356,365,508 P.2d 1121, 1127, 107 Cal.
Rptr. 473, 479 (1973). But the mere fact that investigative and adjudicative functions are united
in one agency "does not, without more, constitute a due process violation." Withrow v.
Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 58 (1975) (medical disciplinary proceeding).
238. See Naismith Dental Corp. v. Board of Dental Examiners, 68 Cal. App. 3d 253, 261,
137 Cal. Rptr. 133, 136 (1977). On the "two-tiered" test under the equal protection clause see
Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 16-17, 485 P.2d 529, 538-39, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 338-39(1971).
239. Hand v. Board of Examiners, 66 Cal. App. 3d 605, 622-23, 136 Cal. Rptr. 187, 198
(1977).
240. Id.
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will provide the required certainty. "241 The court took no note of the fact
that the statute has been changed to require that the licensee have knowledge
that his acts reflect unfavorably; nor did the court note that its rationale is
impaired, if not destroyed, by the recent statutes adding public members to
the licensing board.242 Thus, for the moment at least, we have applicable to
professional licensing the same objection Justice Tobriner had to the obscen-
ity statute: "[The jury is expected both to determine the applicable stan-
dard and to judge whether the defendant's conduct conforms to it., 243
Although the California statutes for many years were quite specific, until
1965 they simply did not include anything resembling general incompetence
as a ground of discipline. In 1965, "gross negligence" and "gross incompe-
tence" were added as bases. In 1974, mere "incompetence," as distin-
guished from "gross incompetence," was made sufficient. And in Septem-
ber 1976, "repeated similar negligent acts" was added as a ground. 244
Historically California thus followed the general pattern until 1965 whereby
it adhered to the fictitious theory that all licensed physicians meet the
minimal requirements of competence required by their respective licensing
boards.245 It then anticipated the criticism stated a few years later to the
United States Senate: "The medical profession has been loathe to weed out
or restrict the practice of those physicians who are in fact guilty of medical
negligence or abuse,'' 46 and tried to create some more nearly effective
public regulatory device. And what has resulted is in general, if not exact,
accord with the recommendation of the Secretary's Commission on Medical
Malpractice: "[T]hat all State Medical Practice acts include specific author-
ity to State licensing bodies to suspend or revoke licenses for professional
incompetence.'"247
The various excoriations of the former Board of Medical Examiners (now
the Board of Medical Quality Assurance) must be evaluated against the facts
that the Board lacked authority to discipline for malpractice until 1965, and
that when authority was granted, it was circumscribed.
The old Board of Medical Examiners was, however, accused of not
exercising even the authority it had under the 1965 changes. The Joint
241. Id.
242. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §4882(k) (prior to its amendment in 1976). See Hand v.
Board of Examiners, 66 Cal. App. 3d 605,622-23, 136 Cal. Rptr. 187, 198(1977), hearing denied
- Cal. 3d -, - P.2d -, - Cal. Rptr. - ([977). The denial of a hearing by the California
Supreme Court does not necessarily indicate a retreat from its prior views. 6 B. WITKIN,
CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, APPEAL §670 (2d ed. 1971), (Supp. 1977). On addition of public
members see CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §4800. See also CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §2100;
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 55.
243. Bloom v. Municipal Court, 16 Cal. 3d71, 89,545 P.2d 229,241, 127 Cal. Rptr. 317,329
(1976) (Tobriner, J., dissenting). See Rabsamen, Medical Malpractice, 235 SCIENTIFIC AMERI-
CAN 18, 21 (Aug. 1976).
244. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §2361.
245. D. LOuISELL & H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE t8.06, at 213 (1973).
246. RIaiCOFF REPORT, supra note 5, at 6.
247. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 52.
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Legislative Audit Committee reported in December 1975: "The Board of
Medical Examiners has by default left the policing of the medical profession
to the tort system and in some instances to the insurance industry.''248 It
supported this accusation by references to my opinion in Gonzales v.
Nork. 249 A sociologist has made a similar but more general accusation:
"Thus in gross cases a man is likely to be expelled from the company of his
present colleagues but not from his profession.''250 But the more recent
enlargement of the authority of the Board of Medical Quality Assurance is
so new, the legislation is so complex, and the administrative problems of
implementing it are so great that there is yet no adequate basis of experience
to warrant either conclusions or predictions. 251
In the present context it is important to note that in 1961 the legislature
added a public member to the then ten physician members of the Board of
Medical Examiners. In 1975, when the name was changed to the Board of
Medical Quality Assurance, it was enlarged to 19 members, "seven of
whom shall be public members.'"'22 Here again California to a degree
anticipated and to a degree paralleled the Secretary's Commission on Med-
ical Malpractice, which, referring to the former California statute, recom-
mended: "that all state licensing boards include lay members.'' 51 And so
we encounter another modern counterpart of the problem in Dr. Bonham's
Case, as amplified in Blumenthal v. Board of Medical Examiners, 2 4 the
mistrust of confining the authority to regulate exclusively to those who are
themselves subject to the regulations-the nagging suspicion of cats ap-
pointed to guard the cream. Whatever solution may eventuate, the problem
lives on.
PRIVATE EFFORTS TO CONTROL THE STANDARD OF CARE
A third way of curtailing malpractice would appear to be through the
action of private groups such as professional societies or hospital staffs,
what has been called "Government by Medical Colleagues. "255 This
method has not been particularly effective for reasons that have been
248. CAL. LEGIS. JOINT LEGIS. AUDIT COMMITrEE, OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL,
REPORT 265.2, Doctors' Malpractice Insurance 14-15 (1975).
249. Memorandum at 139-40, Gonzales v. Nork, Civil No. 228566 (Sacramento County
Sup. Ct. Nov. 27, 1973); rev'dforfailure to grant jury trial, 60 Cal. App. 3d 728, 131 Cal. Rptr.
717 (1976); hearing granted by the California Supreme Court, Oct. 21, 1976 (the case was still
pending at publication time).
250. E. FREIDSON, PROFESSION OF MEDICINE 181 (1970).
Data for medicine are very scarce, but it seems plausible that, as was found to be the
case in law, actual loss of license for gross and obvious instances of unethical or
incompetent behavior is the consequence of publicity that forces the professional
group to act rather than the offense as such.
251. The new law, the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act, Second Extraordinary
Session, CAL. STATS. 1975, c. 1, 2, at 3949, 3979, is discussed in 7 PAC. L.J., REVIEW OF
SELECTED 1975 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION 544 (1976).
252. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §2100.
253. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 55.
254. 57 Cal. 2d 228, 368 P.2d 101, 18 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1962).
255. D. LOuISELL & H. WILLIAMS, THE PARENCHYMA OF LAW 143 (1960).
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canvassed by sociologists, one of whom goes so far as to say: "In matters of
peer regulation, doctors observe the Golden Rule," because each knows
that he has made and is likely to make some terrible and obvious mis-
takes. 256 Another says:
The practitioner is prone to believe that mistakes are bound to be
made by the very nature of clinical work, so that every practition-
er at one time or another is vulnerable to reproach. This belief is
used to excuse oneself and also to restrain one from criticizing
others and them from criticizing him. In looking at others' appa-
rent mistakes the physician is inclined to feel that 'there, but for
the grace of God, go I' and that it may be my turn next.' When he
'gets into trouble,' he expects colleagues to cultivate the same
sense of charity and is inclined to feel that those who are not so
charitable are dogmatic fanatics, to be distrusted and avoided. 57
There are enough cases in the law books to show that the above state-
ments do not express universal truths. But they contain enough truth to
suggest that when physicians through their private associations or hospital
staffs do proceed against incompetents, the law would make it easy for them
to do so. It might seem obvious that in a free society private groups could
make their own rules as stringent as they please both as to substance and
procedure, and then they could eliminate incompetents with a minimum of
expense and delay. In fact this has not been so. While acknowledging some
deference to the professional expertise of medical groups, the common law
has insisted that their rules relating to admission and expulsion be in
accordance with "fair procedure.'' 258
The law concerning private medical groups has been developed from the
general law concerning private groups. The practical beginning, for the
present purposes, is Dawkins v. Antrobus.359 In the language of the trial
judge, Sir George Jessel, the case involved "English gentlemen, who are
always lovers of fair play.' '26 (Sir George, who was Master of the Rolls
under Queen Victoria, not the twentieth century comedian, earned a niche in
legal history by his remark: "I may be wrong, but I never have any
doubts.'")261 Colonel Dawkins was expelled from his club for writing a
derogatory letter to a fellow member in a wrapper openly labelled "Dishon-
ourable Conduct of General Stephenson," which he sent to the General's
public address, the Orderly Room at the Horse Guards. The expulsion was
upheld, because it was found to be not maliciously motivated, in accordance
256. M. MILLMAN, THE UNKINDEST CUT 99 (1976).
257. E. FRIEDSON, PROFESSION OF MEDICINE 179, 180-83 (1970).
258. Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 12 Cal. 3d 541, 555,526 P.2d 253,263,
116 Cal. Rptr. 245, 255 (1974); see Ascherman v. San Francisco Medical Soc'y, 39 Cal. App. 3d
623, 643-44, 114 Cal. Rptr. 681, 693-94 (1974).
259. 17 Ch. D. 615 (1881); 12 Cal. 3d at 550 n.8, 526 P.2d at 260 n.8, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 252
n.8.
260. 17 Ch. D. 615, 625 (1881).
261. 16 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 123 (1966).
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with the club's procedures, and because those procedures were in accord-
ance with "natural justice." Specifically, "natural justice" was held to
include the opportunity to be heard before expulsion. 262 Thus "natural
justice" came to be a judicially imposed restriction on the conduct of private
groups.
The "natural justice" limitation was quickly adopted by the Supreme
Court of California. Indeed, it had already been incorporated to a degree in
the California statutes as a rule of interpretation. 263 And it has been appear-
ing intermittently in cases involving medical associations and other voca-
tional associations ever since. 264 The language has sometimes varied, but
the result has in California always heretofore been the same. Groups oc-
cupying what amount to monopoly positions that affect a fundamental right,
such as the right to work, and agencies, such as hospitals, intimately
associated with the rendition of public services, must have rules both of
substance and procedure that are fundamentally fair and in accordance with
the court's conception of "public policy" and "contemporary application
of common law principles.' '265 For example, a hospital by-law may not
require staff members to waive their rights to seek judicial review of
disciplinary action taken against them by the hospital staff. Such a provision
"transgresses public policy.' 266
The judicial requirement that the rules of private groups be in accordance
with "natural justice," or "public policy," or "contemporary application
of common law principles" is not limited to a medical context, but it has
some special overtones in that context. Beginning with the first cases
applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to malpractice cases, that is the
cases where the doctor must show that he has been careful rather than
requiring the plaintiff to show that the doctor was negligent, and those
enlarging the scope of the community so that a defendant doctor could not
restrict expert testimony to his friends and associates, and continuing
through the informed consent cases, are a number of deliberate statements of
the courts' fear that doctors may arrogate absolute authority to themselves.
The most recent statement I have found is that of Justice Tobriner:
Our court has long recognized, of course, that the existence of
unrestrained authority in hospital boards or professional associa-
262. Dawkins v. Antrobus, 17 Ch. D. at 631; D. HEWITr, NATURAL JUSTICE 98-99 (1972).
263. Otto v. Tailors' Protective & Benevolent Union, 75 Cal. 308, 315, 17 P. 217, 219
(1881); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §1866.
264. Duby v. Baron, Mass., 341 N.E.2d 870, 876 (1976); Annot., 20 A.L.R.2d 531 (1951).
Duby is an illustration of both the reluctance and the difficulty of a medical staff in proceeding
against a member. By agreement the hospital first limited the doctor's surgical privileges,
placed him under a monitor and requested an investigation by the American College of
Surgeons. The College expelled him. Duby v. American College of Surgeons, 468 F.2d 364 (7th
Cir. 1972). Only thereafter did the hospital refuse to reappoint him. Duby v. Jordan Hospital,
Mass., 341 N.E.2d 876 (1976). The proceedings took some seven years.
265. James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 734, 155 P.2d 329, 337 (1941).
266. Westlake Community Hosp. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 465,479,551 P.2d 410,415,
131 Cal. Rptr. 90, 95 (1976).
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tions has at times enveloped an arbitrary selectivity that threatens
to convert the operating room into the province of an elite clique.
Our past decision demonstrate that this court has been adamant in
its endeavor to eradicate monopolistic control of professional
opportunities. 267
The references to "unrestrained authority," "arbitrary selectivity,"
"elite clique," and monopolism are, when considered against the past
reluctance of the profession to discipline itself, readily transposed into Lord
Coke's maxim that no one should be a judge in his own case. This maxim of
"natural justice" has become a rule of constitutional law, as has the rule
requiring the opportunity for a hearing before being disciplined by a public
agency. But the constitutions do not apply to conduct of private groups
unless the groups are involved in "state action."2 68 "[Tihe Fourteenth
Amendment was designed to protect the citizen against government and not
against other citizens.' '269
Thus in Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Society of Orthodontists27 (Pinsker 11),
which is really the most comprehensive and illuminating discussion of the
problem of government by private medical groups I have found, and which
in interests of time and space I have not adequately treated, the court was
careful to point out:
It is important to note that the legal duties imposed on defendant
organizations arise from common law rather than from the Con-
stitution as such; although Pinsker I utilized 'due process' ter-
minology in describing defendant associations' obligations, the
'due process' concept is applicable only in its broadest, noncon-
stitutional connotation. [Citation omitted.] In an attempt to avoid
confusing the common law doctrine involved in the instant case
with constitutional principles, we shall refrain from using 'due
process' language and shall simply refer instead to a requirement
of a 'fair procedure.'271
If all that is involved are common law principles and public policy,
presumably the legislature could change them and give the private groups
267. Id. at 486, 551 P.2d at 422, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 102. See also Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d
229, 243, 502 P.2d 1, 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 514 (1972); Rosner v. Eden Township Hosp. Dist.,
58 Cal. 2d 593, 598-99, 375 P.2d 431, 435, 25 Cal. Rptr. 551, 555 (1962); Huffman v. Lindquist,
37 Cal. 2d 465, 484, 234 P.2d 34, 46 (1951) (Schauer, J., dissenting); Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal.
2d 486, 490-91, 154 P.2d 687, 689 (1944); Ascherman v. Saint Francis Memorial Hosp., 45 Cal.
App. 3d 507, 512-13, 119 Cal. Rptr. 507, 510 (1975); Berkey v. Anderson, I Cal. App. 3d 790,
805, 82 Cal. Rptr. 67, 78 (1969); Bernstein v. Alameda-Contra Costa Medical Ass'n, 139 Cal.
App. 2d 241, 246-47, 293 P.2d 862, 865 (1956); Gist v. French, 136 Cal. App. 2d 247, 257-58, 288
P.2d 1003, 1009-10 (1955).
268. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349-50 (1974); Moose Lodge
No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173 (1972).
269. Friendly, The Dartmouth College Case and the Public-Private Penumbra, 12 TEx. Q.
17 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Friendly].
270. 12 Cal. 3d 541, 526 P.2d 253, 116 Cal. Rptr. 245 (1974).
271. Id. at 550, n.7, 256 P.2d at 259, n.7, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 251, n.7. This effort to distinguish
constitutional and common law principles is not discussed in the otherwise comprehensive
article, Butler, Medicare Appeals Procedures: A Constitutional Analysis, 70 Nw. L. REV. 139,
160-63 (1975). I assume that the article, although published after, was written before PinskerI.
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more authority than the courts have allowed them, unless the common law is
treated in some sense as a higher law, as Lord Coke did, and binding
whether or not it is prescribed in the Constitution.272
Another possibility is to hold that the test of "state action" is not merely
"governmental involvement" of the private agency but whether the agency
is exercising a "public function." 273 The latter is the test the California
Supreme Court has almost, but not quite, accepted. The most penetrating
analysis I have found is that of Judge Friendly, who distinguishes "signifi-
cant state involvement" from serving "essentially public functions" or
"public purposes" and says, "a principle that all Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees apply to all institutions serving 'public functions' is much too
expansive. '"274 He uses the example of a private hospital, which might be
constitutionally required not to discriminate against blacks in its policies of
admitting patients but, nevertheless, might not be required to afford con-
stitutional protections in its staff recruitment or admissions policies, and
suggests, "different values may be assigned to various Fourteenth Amend-
ment protections. "275 The intensity of the conflict in views is illustrated by
the memorandum opinion on denial of review in Greco v. Orange Memorial
Hospital Corp.276
The problem is brought into focus by two of the Ascherman cases. 277 The
United States Court of Appeals held that Ascherman could not state a cause
of action under the old Civil Rights Act against a hospital that denied him
staff privileges on the basis that the hospital had received a federal grant for
construction of facilities. Receipt of such funds was not sufficient govern-
mental involvement to constitute state action.278 But a few months later a
State Court of Appeal held that Ascherman had a right to have his applica-
tion for staff membership considered under fair procedural standards. It
applied to a private hospital "criteria analogous to the constitutional ones
used for 'public hospitals' and put the hypothesis:
272. Goodhart, supra note 131, at 675; Grant, The "Higher Law" Background of the Law
of Eminent Domain, 6 WXis. L. REV. 67, 67-69, 71 (1931). Overtones of this approach can be
heard in Justice Tamura's dissenting opinion in Anton v. San Antonio Community Hosp., 127
Cal. Rptr. 394, 403 (1976) (hearing granted May 14, 1976).
273. Butler, Medicare Appeals Procedures: A ConstitutionalAnalysis, 70 Nw. L. REV. 139,
160-63 (1975) neatly describes the two approaches. See also Murphy v. Society of Real Estate
Appraisers, 388 F. Supp. 1046, 1050-52 (E.D. Wis. 1975), vacated and remanded without
opinion, 544 F.2d 521 (7th Cir. 1976).
274. Friendly, supra note 269, at 18, 24.
275. Friendly, supra note 269, at 22. "There is still less reason for creating a constitutional
mandate that a child care agency receiving a grant-in-aid must have more elaborate procedures
for dismissal of employees than do employers generally. . ." Id. at 30.
276. 423 U.S. 1000, 1001 (1975) (White, J., dissenting).
277. Ascherman v. Presbyterian Hosp., 507 F.2d 1103 (9th Cir. 1974); Ascherman v. Saint
Francis Memorial Hosp., 45 Cal. App. 3d 507, 119 Cal. Rptr. 507 (1975).
278. Dee v. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc., 529 F.2d 638, 643 (4th Cir. 1975);
Murphy v. Society of Real Estate Appraisers, 388 F. Supp. 1046, 1050-52 (E.D. Wis. 1975),
vacated and remanded, 544 F.2d 521 (7th Cir. 1976). Contra Ascherman v. Presbyterian Hosp.,
507 F.2d 1103 (9th Cir. 1974); Butler, Medicare Appeals Procedures: A Constitutional Analysis,
70 Nw. L. REV. 139, 160-63 (1975).
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if the proposition that any hospital occupies a fiduciary trust
relationship between itself, its staff and the public it seeks to serve
is accepted, then the rationale for any distinction between public,
'quasi public' and truly private breaks down and becomes mean-
ingless, especially if the hospital's patients are considered to be of
primary concern.
279
The apparent conflict between the state and federal decisions may seem
surprising, but it is not anomalous. The conclusions federal courts reach
under the Federal Constitution are not necessarily indicative of the conclu-
sions the state courts may reach under analogous provisions of the state
constitutions. The state courts are free to impose higher standards under
state constitutions than the Federal Constitution requires. 28 Which approach
California will take may be resolved in the pending case of Anton v. San
Antonio Community Hospital.281 But since the case is still pending, I, as a
sitting judge, cannot comment on it282 beyond pointing out that it involves a
private hospital and a by-law suggested by the Joint Commission on Ac-
creditation of Hospitals, which puts the burden of proof of freedom from
fault on physician charged rather than on the body making the charge .283 For
me, prediction is neither possible nor permissible. But I recall Justice
Holmes wrote, "[t]he truth is, that the law is always approaching, and never
reaching, consistency.' '284 Unfortunately, only the latter half of his state-
ment is necessarily so.
279. Ascherman v. Saint Francis Memorial Hosp., 45 Cal. App. 3d 507,513, 119 Cal. Rptr.
507, 510 (1975). The court was quoting from Silver v. Castle Memorial Hosp., 53 Haw. 475,482,
497 P.2d 564, 570 (1972). The state court did not cite Ascherman v. Presbyterian Hospital and
relied on the authorities the federal court rejected. In the Duby cases, supra note 264, the
Massachusetts court avoided the problem by holding that the procedures afforded constitution-
al due process whether it was required or not.
280. People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 549, 531 P.2d 1099, 1112, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315, 328
(1975).
281. 127 Cal. Rptr. 394 (1976) (hearing granted May 14, 1976).
282. Cal. Judicial Council, Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3A(6).
283. The case involves an earlier but apparently similar version of the following:
the body whose adverse recommendation or action occasioned the hearing shall have
the initial obligation to present evidence in support thereof, but the practitioner shall
thereafter be responsible for supporting his challenge to the adverse recommendation
or action by clear and convincing evidence that the grounds therefor lack any factual
basis or that such basis or the conclusions drawn therefrom are either arbitrary,
unreasonable, or capricious.
JoiNr COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HOSPITALS, FAIR HEARING PLAN FOR PRACTITIONERS,
Rule 3.7, at 10, (Oct. 6, 1975).
The opinion of the California Supreme Court was published after this paper was prepared for
printing. Anton v. San Antonio Community Hosp., 19 Cal. 3d 802, 567 P.2d 1162, 140 Cal.
Rptr. 140 (1977). The regulation was upheld, but the case was remanded to the superior court
with directions to reweigh the evidence in accordance with Section 1094.5(c) of the Code of
Civil Procedure. The extension to a private group of the requirement that the superior court
reweigh the evidence is beyond the scope of this discussion.
284. 0. HOLMES, supra note 10, at 36.
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CONCLUSION
"History does not provide the answers to the problems of today; it
merely helps to frame the questions. ' 285
When one finds the California Supreme Court in 1974 referring to the
cases of farriers, which we have seen originated about 600 years earlier, one
may get the impression that time stands still. 286 Of course, it does not. We
now know how to discern the "cunning from the uncunning." The Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals has developed one method,
which I cite merely as an example.287 The problems now seem to be to
motivate the medical profession to implement and execute the methods at
hand by means that will be held legally permissible. How are we to balance
the need for professional expertise against the desire for professional domi-
nance? 28s Translated into legal terms this is Lord Coke's rule of natural
justice that one should not be a judge in his own case. Of course, Coke was
afraid of judges who would take overly severe action because they were
motivated by self interest. But our current problem is the converse-that of
doctors as judges or jurors who decline to act because of fear of overt or
subtle retribution. Indeed it may be possible to write a history of medical
quality control through the biographies of physicians such as Dr. Holmes,
Justice Holmes' father, or Semmelweiss, or Codman, or others who were
secure and selfless enough to risk the wrath of their colleagues. 289 For by
and large the law has followed, not caused, the improvement; it simply
requires doctors to do what they have shown they can do.
Obviously some steps have been taken towards solution by the addition of
public members to licensing boards and by the establishment of the Profes-
sional Service Review Organizations under the Social Security Act. But
countervailing these we find the efforts that have been made to relieve
physicians of liability rather than to eliminate malpractice, and the reluct-
ance of physicians to concede or expose "the possibility that the true root of
the crisis may be medical negligence, malpractice itself.''2 9° With these
opposing tendencies we seem to be both legally and medically "at the
beginning of what will be a long development. ' 291
285. Wofford, The Blinding Light: The Uses of History in Constitutional Interpretation, 31
U. CHI. L. REV. 502, 533 (1964).
286. Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 12 Cal. 3d 541,551 n.9, 526 P.2d 253,
261 n.9, 116 Cal. Rptr. 245,253 n.9 (1974). We now know that the reference is not quite accurate
historically. A. SiMpsoN, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT 229-33 (1975). But it
has been accepted, and that is what matters. See Cam, Magna Carta-Event or Document, in
SELDEN SOCIETY LECTURES 26 (1965).
287. JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HOSPITALS, TRUSTEE, PHYSICIAN, ADMINIS-
TRATOR INSTITUTES (1973).
288. Freidson analyzes the problem in sociological terms. E.g., E. FREIDSON, DOCTORING
TOGETHER 213 (1975); E. FREIDSON, PROFESSION OF MEDICINE 336 (1970).
289. Schlicke, American Surgery's Noblest Experiment, 106 ARCHIVES OF SURGERY 379
(1973), gives some clues to this possibility.
290. Henahan, Malpractice, Atlantic Monthly, April 1976, at 1I.
291. Friendly, supra note 269, at 7.
1978 / Medical Competence
I would have liked to close by following the traditional advice: "Cure
sometimes, relieve often, and comfort always." I have failed on all three
counts-a triple error. At least I have not committed the fault attributed to
legal philosophers, that is of discussing a problem only after it has been
solved.2 92 I do hope I have given a little insight into how and why the law
develops.
292. Goodhart, supra note 131, at 679.
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